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INTRODUCTION 
When the United States Supreme Court decided Richmond v. Croson1 in 
1989 and imposed strict scrutiny on state and local government affirmative 
action programs, it marked a critical moment and turning point in the 
evolution and development of public and legal discourse on race, racism, 
and race relations in America.  Although many scholars have critically 
examined the Croson opinion, curiously, scholars have yet to recognize its 
full ramifications and implications.  Aside from the technical doctrinal 
changes made to equal protection law, the Croson decision is also 
important because of the way the Court produced and mapped a new social 
reality of race relations in America.  In the decision, the Court asserted that 
African Americans had achieved racial parity with Whites, and as such, 
that African Americans could no longer rely on a history of racial 
discrimination to justify the enactment of affirmative action programs.2 
In Croson, a white general contractor challenged the constitutionality of 
a Richmond set-aside requiring general contractors to sub-contract thirty 
percent of the contract award to a minority business enterprise.3  The Court 
emphasized that the set-aside was enacted by a Richmond City Council 
controlled by African Americans.4  Thus, instead of being the traditionally 
disempowered political minority, African Americans were seemingly a 
powerful political majority who enacted a law that advantaged their 
African American constituents while disadvantaging the interests of the 
white Richmond minority.  In striking down the city of Richmond’s set-
aside program, the Court effectively concluded that the African American-
controlled Richmond City Council abused its political powers to exact a 
form of racial retribution on the white Richmond minority.5   
In equal protection terminology, the Court in Croson implicitly held that 
African Americans were no longer a disadvantaged, discrete, and insular 
minority in the political process.  In fact, the opposite was true:  for the 
Court, African Americans were now a politically powerful racial faction in 
the American political pluralist arena.  Moreover, the Court seemed to 
imply that African Americans were now politically powerful because of 
and not in spite of having historically suffered from invidious racial 
discrimination. 
                                                 
 1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 2. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (stating that, “an amorphous claim that there has been 
past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial 
quota”). 
 3. Id. at 477-78.  The Richmond set-aside defined a minority business enterprise as a 
business owned by “citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, 
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts.”  Id. at 487. 
 4. Id. at 495. 
 5. Id. at 510. 
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Thus, the Court in Croson radically re-mapped American race relations 
and concluded that because African Americans now had become a political 
majority in cities like Richmond, the Equal Protection Clause was now 
needed to protect the white racial minority from oppressive measures 
enacted by powerful black political majorities.   
This Article, however, will argue that the Court’s mapping of race 
relations in America is profoundly inaccurate and obscures the continuing 
racial, socioeconomic, and political subordination of African Americans.  It 
will critically examine the Croson decision and the remarkable facts of the 
case as openings to evaluate issues of narrative legal theory, the importance 
of examining space and geography in critiquing and constructing legal 
doctrine, the continuing socioeconomic racial segregation of African 
Americans in metropolitan areas throughout the United States, the 
relationship between political power and space/geography, and the future 
of equal protection doctrine. 
Part I of this Article will examine the narrative structure of judicial 
opinions and contend that, in constructing a particular narrative, the legal 
narrator makes certain unconscious and implicit choices regarding the 
spaces and places within which her narrative or story unfolds.  Those 
choices, rather than being neutral, inconsequential choices, deeply shape 
the meaning, message, and rhetorical power of a narrative representation of 
history or reality.  Thus, this Part will contend that an effective method of 
deconstructing dominant legal narratives on race is to uncover and 
deconstruct the spatial assumptions embedded within those narratives.   
Part II of this Article will discuss the facts, holding, and reasoning in 
Croson.  Specifically, it will focus on the majority opinion of Justice 
O’Connor, the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia, and the dissenting 
opinion by Justice Marshall, and will examine their legal narratives.  This 
Article will then argue that the Croson majority, and Justice Scalia in 
particular, constructed a compelling, coherent legal narrative to justify 
imposing strict scrutiny review on affirmative action programs. 
Part III of this Article will argue that the Croson majority constructed 
legal narratives about racial power relations inside the city of Richmond 
that obscure and obfuscate the reality of the continuing political and 
socioeconomic subordination experienced by African Americans.  Their 
narratives obscure the reality of African American subordination through 
the manipulation of geographic setting and scale.  Thus, this Article will 
analyze the Court’s legal narrative by critically examining a key 
geographic assumption in the narrative,6 specifically, the assumption that 
                                                 
 6. In this Article, I sometimes refer to the Croson narratives in the plural and other 
times I refer to the Croson narrative in the singular.  In some instances, I refer to Justice 
Scalia’s narrative specifically, and sometimes I treat Justice Scalia’s narrative and Justice 
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the geographic scale of the narrative had to be limited to the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the city of Richmond.   
Part III contends that a different social reality of race and racial 
subordination emerges once the Croson narrative is set within broader 
geographic settings.  This Part will examine the situation in Croson from 
four different geographic perspectives.  The first section of Part III will 
examine the Croson situation from the national and regional geographic 
scale and contend that the Court’s argument that the case was about 
protecting the white Richmond minority was misplaced, because the 
corporation that sued the city of Richmond was neither based in Richmond 
nor incorporated in Virginia.7  Rather, Croson Co. is a general contractor 
incorporated in Ohio and based in the city of Columbus.8  Thus, the 
Madisonian rationale and political process theory rationale was not even 
relevant to the supposed “victim” of local government racial tyranny, as 
Croson Co. is neither a “citizen” of the city of Richmond nor a natural 
person.  The fact that Croson Co. is a corporation operating within the Ohio 
mid-atlantic region further complicates the analysis of the Court, especially 
because corporations do not easily fit within the Madisonian or political 
process theory framework, by virtue of the fact that corporations can be in 
multiple places simultaneously, and thus have multiple bases for 
“citizenship.” 
The second section of Part III will re-examine Croson from the state 
geographic scale.  Specifically, this section will examine Justice 
O’Connor’s political process argument and contend that her application of 
Professor Ely’s political process theory is flawed and does not necessarily 
support her conclusion that heightened federal court scrutiny was 
appropriate under Professor Ely’s jurisprudential justification for 
heightened equal protection scrutiny.  This Part will argue that in order to 
portray the set-aside as a result of black majoritarian local tyranny, the 
Court had to ignore and obfuscate the status of the city of Richmond as a 
subordinate arm of the Commonwealth of Virginia.  If Justice O’Connor 
had correctly treated the city of Richmond as an agent of the state, she 
would have had to have concluded that the set-aside was technically 
enacted to advance the state’s white majority’s interests in promoting the 
racial integration of the Virginia construction industry.   
The third section of Part III will re-examine the Croson situation from 
the Richmond metropolitan area geographic scale.  Once the narrative is 
situated within the Richmond metropolitan area, it becomes clear that while 
African Americans may be a political majority within the City of 
                                                                                                                 
O’Connor’s narrative as essentially telling a slightly different version of the same story. 
 7. J.A. Croson Co. v. Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 8. Id. 
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Richmond, they are still a subordinate political minority within the greater 
Richmond metropolitan area.  Moreover, examining Croson as a narrative 
regarding suburban-urban relations will expose a troubling paradox:  
African American attainment of formal political control of local 
governments actually is a reflection of their continuing political and socio-
economic subordination and not a reflection of racial progress.   
In short, the fact that Blacks became a political majority in the City of 
Richmond in 1977 is not evidence of improving socioeconomic conditions 
for Blacks; instead, it is evidence of precisely the opposite:  Black political 
power, especially at the local level, has been gained while socioeconomic 
conditions worsened for a substantial number of African Americans living 
in the central cities of America.9  An inverse relationship between 
socioeconomic power and formal political power exists for African 
Americans because throughout the 1980s and 1990s, African Americans 
have experienced greater segregation in public schools and in residential 
areas on both a racial and socioeconomic basis.10  Moreover, because of the 
threat of jurisdictional exit, the white Richmond suburban majority and 
even the white Richmond city minority are able to exert enormous 
influence and control over the City’s policymaking, further undermining 
the substantive political power of African Americans. 
Finally, the fourth section of Part III will re-map political process theory 
in light of the geographical analysis conducted in this Article.  This section 
will contend that African Americans are disadvantaged in the Virginia 
political process because they are systemic political losers in the state 
political process regarding the regulation of local governments.  
Specifically, it will examine Virginia’s ban on the City of Richmond’s 
powers of annexation as an example of a malfunction in the state political 
process.  The power to annex new territory is one tool the City could use to 
deal with its socioeconomic problems.  However, the Virginia state 
legislature has specifically targeted and prohibited large Virginia cities like 
Richmond from being able to use its annexation powers until 2010, in large 
part to protect the interests of the predominantly white suburbs.  The 
structure of local government relations in Virginia systemically 
                                                 
 9. See David B. Wilkins, Doing Well by Doing Good?  The Role of Public Service in 
the Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 33 (2004) (emphasizing that, 
since Brown v. Bd. of Educ., the rise in black political power has been mostly local); John 
Charles Boger, The Urban Crisis:  The Kerner Commission Report Revisited, 71 N.C. L. 
REV. 1289, 1347 (1993) (conceding that the living conditions for Blacks in “inner-cities” 
have become demonstrably worse in the past thirty years). 
 10. See Gary Orfield, Harvard Univ. Civil Rights Project, Schools More Separate:  
Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, at 2-3, 23-25 (July 2001) (asserting that 
segregation increased throughout the 1990s because of an attitude that “nothing can be 
done” and because of an increase in residential segregation), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Schools_More_Separate.pdf. 
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disadvantages African Americans living in Richmond, and thus, under 
political process theory, the state ban on annexation should be declared in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Finally, in Part IV, this Article 
will conclude by discussing some of the implications that flow from a 
geographical analysis of law and legal narratives. 
I. LAW AS NARRATIVE:  JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND THE NARRATIVE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 
The law is constituted as narrative.11  When courts construct legal 
doctrine and write judicial opinions, they do so by organizing and 
interpreting events according to a narrative in which the events and 
characters are interwoven with each other and into an “overarching 
structure” where conflicts are created.12  For example, when a court 
declares that a government is engaged in invidious racial discrimination 
and subsequently strikes down a statute, it must first construct a narrative in 
which a character (the plaintiff) is faced with an obstacle or problem (racial 
discrimination) posed by an antagonist (a racially discriminatory 
government entity).  In framing a racial discrimination lawsuit in this way, 
a court assembles a set of circumstances into an “intelligible whole,”13 and 
then into a coherent narrative in which the actions and events are endowed 
with intentionality, meaning, and purpose.14 
To explain the meaning-making effects of narrative, it is useful to 
compare an un-narrated account of facts and situations to a narrated 
account.  Historian Hayden White contrasts an annal with a narrative.15  An 
annal “consists only of a list of events ordered in chronological 
                                                 
 11. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 112 (2000) 
(arguing that law is no different from narrative as it carries with it the rules that our society 
valued at the time the law was written); GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY 
CRITICISMS OF LAW 261 (2000) (recognizing that judges and juries are required to interpret 
facts and that thus, a legal dispute is naturally transformed into a narrative through this 
interpretation); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228-29 (1986) (arguing that law operates 
as a “chain novel”); L.H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION:  NARRATIVE IN THE 
RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY 2 (1995) (arguing that the judicial opinions are persuasive because 
judges include fictitious rhetoric throughout opinions).  See generally Patrick Ewick & 
Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales:  Toward Sociology of Narrative, 
29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 197 (1995) (discussing the sociology of narrative as used by legal 
scholars). 
 12. See Ewick & Silbey, supra note 11, at 200 (conceptualizing the reasons narratives 
allow time and space to be placed in order to create a full picture of events). 
 13. See Paul Ricoeur, Narrative Time, in ON NARRATIVE 165, 167 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 
1981) (describing how a story is created by stringing together events to create a “plot”). 
 14. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 591, 592 (1981) (charging that rational legal arguments are derived from an 
interpretive construction of the situation that suits the requirements of the attorney). 
 15. HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM:  NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND 
HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 4-5 (1987). 
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sequence.”16  A narrative, on the other hand, organizes separate events 
according to a plot, connecting and locating them according to an 
overarching structure or theme.17  As a literary theorist notes, “‘The king 
died, and then the queen died’ is [an annal].  ‘The king died and then the 
queen died of grief’ is a [narrative] plot.  Considering the death of the 
queen, if it is in an [annal] we say:  ‘And then?’  However, if it is in a 
[narrative] plot we ask:  ‘Why?’”18  An annal does not create meaning 
because the chronicler does not supply a causal relationship between 
separate events.19  A narrative, on the other hand, shows how one event 
(death of the king) relates to another (caused the queen to die of grief), and 
in so doing, endows the events with purpose and meaning. 
The meaning-making function of narrative, therefore, is what makes 
narrative such a powerful determinant of legal decision-making.  As Mark 
Kelman contends, prior to the evolution of a legal sounding-argument, a 
situation must be characterized through a narrative construct.20  Thus, when 
a court has constructed a narrative, it means that it has already determined 
the meaning, moral, and purpose inherent to a set of facts and 
circumstances; it has created a narrative that not only recounts what 
transpired but also instructs society about its meaning and the correct way 
to feel about the events.21  Consequently, once the meaning of events is 
made clear, the legal result that flows from a narrative rendering of a set of 
events seems necessary and inevitable.22 
In organizing and interpreting events according to a narrative structure, 
courts actively construct and produce their versions of social reality, 
versions which then become codified in legal doctrine.23  Contrary to the 
conventional view of judicial lawmaking, instead of taking established 
facts and mechanically applying the law to them, courts actually create 
narrative accounts of social reality and then make legal judgments and 
decisions based on their narrative accounts.24 
                                                 
 16. Id. at 5 
 17. Kelman, supra note 14, at 593. 
 18. WILLIAM LOWELL RANDALL, THE STORIES WE ARE:  AN ESSAY IN SELF-CREATION 
121 (1995) (quoting E. M. FORSTER, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL 87 (1962)). 
 19. See id. (arguing that a story’s meaning is created when the author connects its 
events through a series of cause and effect scenarios); see also WHITE, supra note 15, at 5 
(asserting that an annal does not possess a “structure” capable of creating meaning out of 
separate chronologically ordered events). 
 20. Kelman, supra note 14, at 593. 
 21. See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 161 (arguing that historians create history by 
compiling facts to create narratives). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. at 36 (contending that law is created when competing lawyers repeat the 
version of their client’s story over and over again until a judge creates the final narrative that 
becomes law). 
 24. Id. 
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A. Legal Narratives Reinforce and Reproduce Dominant Cultural, 
Political, and Social Beliefs 
When we understand that courts engage in the invisible process of 
constructing narratives as a precondition to making legal decisions, we can 
better understand how law actively constructs hegemonic visions of social 
reality.25  Social reality can be defined as “the bundle of presuppositions, 
received wisdom, and shared understandings against a background of 
which legal and political discourse takes place.”26  A narrative construction 
of social reality explains and makes sense of human behavior and the 
structures of everyday life.27  Hegemonic narratives are those that 
rationalize and justify existing institutions and structures of inequality and 
subordination.28  For example, hegemonic narratives about the relationship 
between unregulated markets and the accumulation of societal wealth help 
to rationalize socioeconomic inequality as a natural and necessary by-
product of economic efficiency.29 
Legal narratives, in particular, are especially powerful in reinforcing 
dominant constructions of social reality because they have the weight and 
imprimatur of state authority behind them.30  In a legal dispute, a judge has 
to choose between competing narrative constructions of what happened in 
the past, declare one story over another as the definitively true version, and 
create rights or impose liability on a party based on the story that he or she 
has chosen as the truth.31  When a court chooses a particular narrative over 
another, the chosen narrative becomes the official government truth, and 
therefore becomes even more powerful as rhetoric in public discourse 
precisely because that particular narrative now has the sanction and force of 
the law.  In short, law consists of stories given authority and truth by virtue 
of being told and validated by a judge. 
                                                 
 25. See PETER KOLLOCK & JODI O’BRIEN, THE PRODUCTION OF REALITY:  ESSAYS AND 
READINGS ON SOCIAL INTERACTION 541-42 (2d ed. 1997) (realizing that judges and juries are 
limited in their search for the truth and thus are merely able to reconstruct the truth within 
the confines of the law); see also Ewick & Silbey, supra note 11, at 213 (explaining that our 
culture is defined by narratives). 
 26. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:  A Plea for Narrative, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1989). 
 27. See id. at 2412-15 (interpreting stories told by different groups within the 
population to demonstrate how each version of the same story presents a different reality). 
 28. Id. at 212. 
 29. See id. at 213 (finding that in society, narratives further the “existing structures of 
meaning and power”). 
 30. Cf. id. at 208-09 (noting that judges exercise control over the law by the use of 
limited narrative as a means to convey a certain side of a story that only advances certain 
goals, while ignoring other facts or characterizations that change the story). 
 31. See, e.g., id. at 209 (noting also that lawyers only allow witnesses to tell facts that 
enhance the lawyer’s version of the story, and that the lawyer intervenes when a witness 
continues to speak beyond what the lawyer requires). 
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B. Critiquing Dominant Legal Narrative Constructions of Social Reality 
As argued above, although dominant legal narratives of social reality 
appear as objective descriptions of society, they are actually constructed in 
much the same way as a novelist or historian constructs a story.32  The 
process of narrative construction in law requires courts to select the 
relevant facts and categories which will then provide the framework for 
formal legal argumentation.  In making these selective choices, courts are 
actively engaging in narrative construction, instead of merely reporting and 
describing objective social reality. 
Thus, an effective way of deconstructing dominant legal narratives is to 
expose the narrative techniques used to construct a seemingly unmediated 
objective account of an event.  Exposing the use of literary techniques 
reveals that the legal narrator had to make choices about what facts to 
include in the narrative and what facts to exclude.  As Hayden White notes, 
“Every narrative, however, seemingly ‘full,’ is constructed on the basis of a 
set of events that might have been included but were left out.”33  Thus, 
exposing the legal narrator’s representational choices reveal that the 
narrator did not “find” reality, but that he built it according to his subjective 
values and his belief system.34 
C. Space, Not Time, Hides Consequences From Us:  Examining Spatial 
Constructs in Dominant Legal Narratives 
One effective way of unpacking a hegemonic narrative is to uncover all 
the conscious and unconscious spatial or geographic constructs embedded 
within the narrative.  A narrative that organizes itself around a coherent 
plot often achieves its coherence by ignoring and obscuring the spatial or 
geographic dimensions of social reality.35  John Berger argues it is no 
longer possible to tell a coherent story unfolding sequentially over time, 
both because in today’s postmodern world, we are too self-aware of events 
that continually disrupt the linear, temporal flow of a story-line, and 
because we are too self-aware of the geographic “simultaneity and 
extension of events and possibilities.”36  Berger points to the increasing 
interconnectedness of the postmodern world as a main cause for our 
                                                 
 32. See L.H. LARUE, supra note 11, at 10 (finding that judicial opinions, although 
perceived as facts declaring the law, are in fact fictional stories built on a compilation of 
facts that are ordered according to how judges intend to tell stories). 
 33. WHITE, supra note 15, at 10. 
 34. See id. (finding that a narrator adds choice adjectives to describe the mood present 
at an event or time). 
 35. Id. at 110-11. 
 36. EDWARD W. SOJA, THIRDSPACE:  JOURNEYS TO LOS ANGELES AND OTHER REAL-AND-
IMAGINED PLACES 165-66 (1996) (quoting JOHN BERGER, THE LOOK OF THINGS 40 (1974)). 
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constantly having to take into account the “simultaneity and extension of 
events and possibilities”:37 
There are many reasons why this should be so:  the range of modern 
means of communications:  the scale of modern power:  the degree of 
personal political responsibility that must be accepted for events all over 
the world:  the fact that the world has become indivisible; the unevenness 
of economic development within that world; the scale of exploitation.  
All these play a part.  Prophecy now involves a geographical rather than 
historical projection; it is space not time that hides consequences from 
us . . . Any contemporary narrative which ignores the urgency of this 
dimension is incomplete and acquires the oversimplified character of a 
fable.38 
In this remarkable passage, Berger contends that any narrative, legal or 
historical, that ignores the geographic “simultaneity and extension of 
events and possibilities,” is a narrative that is likely more a construct of a 
storyteller’s imagination rather than a representation of reality.39  Such a 
narrative actually hides from the audience the consequences and realities of 
the material world.40 
Moreover, in terms of the role that narratives play in the law, these 
narrative choices about which spaces and places to include or exclude are 
choices that can help to mask and obscure power relations and power 
dynamics.  As geographer Doreen Massey explains, “Social space can 
helpfully be understood as a social product, as constituted out of social 
relations, and social interactions.”41  Moreover, precisely because it is 
constituted out of social relations, spatiality is always and everywhere an 
expression and medium of power.42 
Thus, critical legal theorists should explicitly theorize about space, 
because the organization and production of space is ultimately about social 
and political control and power, and therefore we cannot fully understand 
the phenomenon of power without understanding how power operates 
                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 166 (arguing that any narrative which disregards the spatial dimension is 
insufficient in conveying meaning and is similar to the oversimplified narrative of a fable). 
 40. See id. at 165 (asserting that the use of spatial narrative rather than the 
chronological narrative is necessary to reveal the critical perspective needed to practically 
and theoretically evaluate the present world). 
 41. See DOREEN MASSEY, Space/Power, Identity/Difference:  Tensions in the City, in 
THE URBANIZATION OF INJUSTICE 100, 104 (Andy Merrifield & Erik Swyngedouw eds., 
1997) (using the influence that major trade policies, such as NAFTA and GATT, have over 
the reorganization of the population of major world cities to illustrate that social space in the 
modern world is defined by constant changing social forces and interactions). 
 42. See id. (arguing that the size of a city’s population is a reflection on powerful social 
forces, such as global trade agreements and national agricultural policies, which have 
influenced change in the city’s social structure). 
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through and in spaces and places.43  For example, not only must a theory on 
race relations ask how society has relied on historical and cultural norms to 
construct racial categories, but it must also ask how a particular society has 
used space to construct racial categories and ask how the legal production 
and representation of space works to create and perpetuate racial 
oppression.44 
How does one go about uncovering and critically examining the 
embedded spatial constructs in a legal narrative?  To examine and 
deconstruct the “spaces and places” of a narrative means at least two 
things:  First, a critical analysis could examine the geographic scale or 
setting of a narrative.  This inquiry asks:  where does the story take place?  
It also asks where else could it have taken place?  Second, a critical 
analysis could examine the movement of people within the spaces and 
places in which the narrative unfolds.  The latter line of geographic inquiry 
assumes that where people are located has great significance, and that 
questioning, in a particular story, people’s location at any given time and 
place can help to disrupt and deconstruct the plot of a legal narrative.  This 
inquiry asks:  where are the “characters” from?  Where are they now?  How 
did they get from there to here? 
In the following parts, this Article will examine a Supreme Court 
decision dealing with race and affirmative action.  Then, it will engage in a 
geographical analysis of the legal narratives in that case. 
II. RICHMOND V. CROSON AND THE NEW MAPPING OF RACE RELATIONS 
IN AMERICA 
In Richmond v. J.A. Croson,45 the Supreme Court reviewed the 
affirmative action set-aside program enacted by the city of Richmond and 
struck it down for violating the Equal Protection Clause under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.46  Croson is a landmark equal protection case 
because it was the first time the majority of the Court agreed to subject 
race-conscious affirmative action programs to the highest level of scrutiny, 
essentially equating race-conscious measures attempting to racially 
integrate the labor market with white racial discrimination against racial 
                                                 
 43. See SOJA, supra note 36, at 86-87 (emphasizing that power is contextualized and 
made concrete through the production of social space). 
 44. See id. at 84-86 (employing the works of Bell Hooks, who characterized the space 
of everyday life as a place where all forms of oppression can be found, to illustrate the 
significant role that space and geography play in the study of race relations). 
 45. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 46. Id. at 510-11 (concluding that Richmond’s plan of awarding city construction 
contracts to minority businesses violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the city failed to demonstrate a compelling government interest 
justifying the plan and because the plan was not a narrowly tailored means to remedy the 
effects of past discrimination). 
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minorities.47  Prior to Croson, the Court had been sharply divided over 
what standard of review to use to examine the constitutionality of 
affirmative action programs.48  Justice O’Connor, writing the plurality 
opinion, held that the race-based set-aside must be subject to strict scrutiny, 
and that under strict scrutiny, the set-aside violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.49 
The facts in Croson presented a perfect opportunity for the Court to 
severely restrict the power of state and local governments to enact race 
conscious affirmative action programs.  Specifically, in Croson, the Court 
dealt with an affirmative action program enacted by a black majority 
controlled legislative body.50  Proponents of affirmative action typically 
justify it as a necessary tool to remedy the effects of past racial 
discrimination against African Americans.51  The background social reality 
underlying the arguments for affirmative action is the belief that African 
Americans are a disadvantaged, politically powerless racial minority group 
who have been oppressed and discriminated against because of their race.52 
In Croson, however, that old social reality came into sharp conflict with 
the particular facts of the case.  In Croson, Blacks were now in control of 
the governing legislative body in Richmond.53  The Blacks on the city 
council then enacted legislation benefiting their constituency—the black 
population in Richmond.54  In Croson, therefore, Blacks seemed neither 
                                                 
 47. See id. at 472 (finding that, because the Richmond plan denied a certain class of 
citizens a right to compete for public contract works based exclusively on race, a strict 
scrutiny standard should be applied, and further explaining that the application of this 
standard does not depend upon the race of those who are burdened or benefited by such a 
classification). 
 48. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutnick, 448 U.S. 448, 490-92 (1980) (affirming the 
constitutionality of a congressional statute, which required ten percent of federal public 
work project grants be awarded to minority-owned businesses, because the program was 
limited in extent and duration and was a narrowly tailored means to remedy past 
discriminatory treatment of minorities from public work projects). 
 49. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 505 (asserting that, because Richmond’s set-aside 
program denied certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed public contract solely 
on the basis of race, such classifications must be evaluated under the strict scrutiny standard 
and finding that the city failed to demonstrate a compelling government interest to justify 
the plan). 
 50. See id. (indicating that Blacks constituted approximately fifty percent of the 
population in Richmond at the time of Croson and that the majority of the seats on the city 
council were held by Blacks). 
 51. See id. at 496 (citing Univ. of California Bd. of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
288-89 (1978), which indicated that reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored 
minorities in medical school and the medical profession was one of the major justifications 
offered in support of a plan that reserved a certain number of admission seats for minority 
applicants at the University of California at Davis). 
 52. See id. at 494 (explaining that one of the problems with racial classifications is that 
they may promote notions of racial inferiority by enforcing the belief that certain groups of 
minorities are unable to achieve success without special protections). 
 53. See id. at 495. 
 54. See id. (indicating that Blacks constituted over fifty percent of the population in 
Richmond at that time). 
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politically powerless nor disadvantaged.55  In this situation, because the 
prevailing social reality no longer seemed to fit the circumstances, the 
Court constructed a new social reality of race to explain what had occurred 
in Croson.  That social reality inverted the status of African Americans as a 
systemically disadvantaged racial minority and reconstructed African 
Americans as a politically powerful racial majority.56  Within this new 
social reality, African Americans are not only “equal” with Whites but also 
are now in a position to engage in the racial oppression of Whites.57 
Thus, Croson is a significant case, not only because the Court made 
significant changes in affirmative action equal protection jurisprudence, but 
also because the Court constructed a new social reality of race relations in 
America, a reality which has dramatically changed the dynamics of the 
affirmative action and race debate in legal and public discourse.   
This part of the Article will discuss and examine the Court’s narrative 
constructions of race relations in Richmond.  Part III will then deconstruct 
the narratives through a critical analysis of their geographic assumptions. 
A. The Social Reality in Justice O’Connor’s Legal Narrative:   Blacks are 
no Longer a Historically Disadvantaged Racial Minority in the Political 
Process 
In justifying the Court’s decision to impose strict scrutiny on benign 
racial classifications, Justice O’Connor took note of the racial composition 
of the Richmond city council in order to address Professor John Hart Ely’s 
representation reinforcement theory for treating benign racial 
classifications with greater deference than invidious racial classifications.58  
Throughout her opinion, Justice O’Connor expressed her strong concern 
that Richmond’s set-aside  program was a result of “simple racial 
politics.”59  In an ingenious move, Justice O’Connor used Professor Ely’s 
political process theory to justify the Court’s decision to subject local 
                                                 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”:  
The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. of 
Ill. L. Rev. 615, 637 (arguing contemporary equal protection analysis inverts concepts of 
privilege and subordination, reserving the most exacting level of scrutiny for laws burdening 
historically privileged groups). 
 57. See id. at 495-96 (noting that heightened judicial scrutiny is required in this case 
because the city’s black political majority could disadvantage the city’s white minority 
based on unwarranted facts and assumptions). 
 58. See id. at 495 (referencing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 170 (1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST], which 
argues that it is not appropriate for benign racial classification to undergo a heightened 
scrutiny analysis when a dominant racial group chooses to disadvantage itself for the sake of 
minority racial groups). 
 59. See id. at 493 (arguing that, in the absence of judicial inquiry into the justification 
of race-based measures, it is difficult to distinguish between classifications that are designed 
to be benign or remedial from those that are based on simple racial politics). 
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affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny.60  Further, Justice O’Connor 
used the Croson fact pattern not merely to rebut Professor Ely’s political 
process theory argument, but also to conclude, in effect, that African 
Americans were no longer a historically disadvantaged discrete and insular 
minority.  Also, Justice O’Connor used the fact pattern to argue that they 
had become a well-organized, powerful interest group in the American 
pluralist political system.61   
1. Facts of the case 
In 1983, a black-majority-controlled Richmond City Council enacted the 
five-year Minority Business Utilization (“MBE”) Plan.62  The MBE plan 
was based on evidence which showed that between 1977 and 1982, while 
the city of Richmond consisted of a fifty percent black population, only 
.67% of the general construction contract dollars went to black owned 
businesses.63  Under the set-aside, any contractor submitting a bid for a city 
contract was required to sub-contract thirty percent of the contract dollar 
value to one or more Minority Business Enterprises, or MBEs.64  The set-
aside defined an MBE as a business owned and controlled by a “black, 
Hispanic, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut.”65  The set-aside did not place 
any geographic limitations on MBE eligibility; in other words, an MBE did 
not have to be located within the city of Richmond in order to participate in 
the program.66 
J.A. Croson Company, a white-owned general contracting firm 
incorporated in Ohio, challenged the legality of the set-aside, after the City 
refused to accept Croson’s low bid on a construction contract because it did 
not propose to subcontract thirty percent of the contract award to an 
MBE.67  The Croson company sued in Virginia state court, challenging the 
                                                 
 60. See id. at 496 (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial 
Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 739 n.58 (1974) [hereinafter Ely, Reverse Racial 
Discrimination], which argued that, even though benign racial classification is not as 
suspect as that of invidious classification, a law that favors Blacks over Whites would be 
suspect if it were enacted by a legislature that was predominantly black). 
 61. See id. (implying that heightened scrutiny was an appropriate standard in the case 
because Blacks are no longer considered the political minority in Richmond and because the 
black majority could have enacted the plan to disadvantage the white minority). 
 62. See id. at 477 (observing that the MBE plan required prime contractors to whom the 
city awarded construction contracts and that these contractors were required to subcontract 
at least thirty percent of the contract to one or more minority owned businesses). 
 63. Id. at 479-80. 
 64. Id. at 478. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. (noting that any qualified MBE from any U.S. state could take advantage of 
Richmond’s thirty percent set-aside program). 
 67. See id. at 481-83 (indicating that the city council rejected Croson’s bid despite the 
fact that only one MBE in Richmond expressed interest to Croson in supplying fixtures for 
the contract work, that the MBE’s ability to supply the fixtures was contingent upon 
approval of a credit report and that the acceptance of the MBE’s bid would have increased 
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set-aside on state law and equal protection grounds.68  The lawsuit was 
subsequently removed by the city of Richmond to federal district court.69  
The district court ruled that the city had legal authority to enact the set-
aside, and that the set-aside did not violate equal protection.70  On appeal, 
the Fourth Circuit Court reversed the district court’s ruling, holding that the 
set-aside violated the equal protection clause.71  The Supreme Court, in a 
plurality opinion written by Justice O’Connor, upheld the Fourth Circuit 
ruling and struck down the set-aside.72  Moreover, a majority of the Court 
agreed that state and local government race-based affirmative action 
programs must be subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review.73 
2. Justice O’Connor’s rationale for subjecting affirmative action
 programs to strict scrutiny 
In holding that state and local government affirmative action plans must 
be subject to strict scrutiny, the Croson Court concluded that both “benign” 
racial classifications and invidious racial classifications should be 
scrutinized under the same standard of review.74  Under the strict scrutiny 
test, the courts first determine whether the state has a compelling interest in 
relying on a racial classification.75  Once a compelling state interest is 
identified, the courts must determine if the racial classification is narrowly 
tailored to advance the compelling state interest.76 
                                                                                                                 
the cost of the project by seven percent). 
 68. See id. at 483 (arguing that the Richmond set-aside program was unconstitutional 
because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 69. See id. (noting that the action was eventually brought to the Federal District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia). 
 70. See id. at 484-85 (discussing the district court’s upholding of Richmond’s set-aside 
plan based on the conclusion by Richmond’s city council that low minority participation in 
the contract industry was the result of past discrimination and that the plan was a reasonable 
means of remedying such past actions). 
 71. See J.A. Croson Co. v. Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1357-61 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(concluding that the set-aside plan did not satisfy the strict scrutiny standard because using a 
race-based quota as a means to remedy past discrimination based on a “broad-brush 
assumption of historic discrimination” cannot be considered a compelling governmental 
interest).  The court also found that the thirty percent set-aside was not narrowly tailored 
enough to accomplish the remedial goal. 
 72. Croson, 488 U.S. at 511. 
 73. See id. at 493 (noting the usefulness of strict scrutiny in the context of race-based 
legislation). 
 74. See id. at 493 (emphasizing that the purpose of the strict scrutiny analysis is to 
“smoke out” the illegitimate use of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a 
significant goal to warrant the use of a highly suspect tool like racial classification, but also 
noting that, in the case of benign classification, it is difficult to determine whether or not the 
use of race is motivated by illegitimate goals). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. (stating that the strict scrutiny test ensures that the means chosen to achieve 
the compelling goal fit closely with the goal to assure that there is little possibility that the 
motive for the racial classification is not based on illegitimate racial prejudice or 
stereotype). 
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Justice O’Connor reasoned that the entire purpose of heightened scrutiny 
was to determine whether a racial classification was invidious or benign, 
and that determination cannot be made before the Court applies the strict 
scrutiny test to the racial classification: 
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-
based measures, there is simply no way of determining what 
classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and what classifications are in 
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial 
politics.  Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” 
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing 
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.  The test 
also ensures that the means chosen “fit” this compelling goal so closely 
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or 
stereotype.77 
Justice O’Connor’s detailed reference to the “smoking out” purpose of 
strict scrutiny has its basis in the political process theory of heightened 
equal protection judicial review.78  Under this theory, heightened judicial 
scrutiny ensures that discrete and insular minorities are able to fully 
participate in the legislative process.79  The political process theory of 
judicial review has its genesis in the famous footnote four of United States 
v. Carolene Products Co.80 
Professor Ely has developed the most elaborate and sophisticated version 
of political process theory.  Under his theory, judicial intervention into the 
political process is justified when the process malfunctions and fails to 
protect the rights of discrete and insular minorities.  Ely describes two 
types of political malfunctions.  First, a malfunction exists when “the ins 
are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay 
in and the outs will stay out.”81  Second, a malfunction exists when 
“representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically 
disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced 
refusal to recognize commonalties of interest, and thereby denying that 
minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative system.”82 
                                                 
 77. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. 
 78. See id. (arguing that the strict scrutiny standard must be applied to race-based 
classification to ensure that such measure is not based on illegitimate prejudice or stereotype 
of the minority members of society whether they are white or black). 
 79. See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 58, at 76 (citing United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) which noted that heightened judicial 
scrutiny of legislation that burdens certain groups based on race may be justified because 
such prejudice limits the ability of those groups to participate fully in the political process). 
 80. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1937) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
 81. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 58, at 103. 
 82. Id. 
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Thus, for example, when a racial majority in the legislature consistently 
enacts legislation that disadvantages and burdens racial minorities, Ely 
contends that such results may flow from a distortion in the normal 
workings of the political process.83  Accordingly, in such a situation, Ely 
contends that courts should closely examine any racial classifications 
enacted by a racial majority against a racial minority to “smoke out” racist 
or invidious motives that may have created a political process in which a 
racial minority group consistently ends up as a “loser” in the process.84 
Ely argues, however, that political process theory does not justify strict 
scrutiny of “benign racial classifications.”85  In determining when it is 
appropriate for the judiciary to override a legislative decision, Ely contends 
that courts should be more vigorous in their scrutiny of legislative 
enactments when, in any given case, a danger exists that a majority in the 
legislature may have enacted legislation as a way to “tyrannize” discrete 
and insular minorities.86  When white-controlled legislatures enact 
affirmative action programs to benefit Blacks and other disadvantaged 
racial minorities, Ely argues, little danger exists that the racial classification 
is a result of a defect in the political process:  “When the group that 
controls the decision making process classifies so as to advantage a 
minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually 
suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are 
lacking.”87  In this situation: 
There is no danger that the coalition that makes up the white majority in 
our society is going to deny to Whites generally their right to equal 
concern and respect.  Whites are not going to discriminate against all 
Whites for reasons of racial prejudice, and neither will they be tempted 
generally to underestimate the needs and deserts of whites relative to 
those, say, of blacks . . . .88 
The Croson fact pattern, however, presented a perfect scenario in which 
to undermine the political process justification for treating affirmative 
action programs with greater judicial deference.  Simply put, when Blacks 
gain political power and enact an affirmative action plan to benefit their 
black constituents, it is easy to argue that it is no longer possible to 
distinguish, without subjecting the racial classification to strict scrutiny, 
                                                 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. at 146 (reasoning that the function of heightened scrutiny, which demands 
that suspect classifications closely fit the purpose of the legislation, is to identify 
unconstitutional motives). 
 85. Ely, Reverse Racial Discrimination, supra note 60, at 727 (arguing that “special 
scrutiny” is not appropriate in cases of “reverse racial discrimination” because it is not 
constitutionally suspect for a majority to discriminate against itself). 
 86. Id. at 732. 
 87. Id. at 735. 
 88. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 58, at 170. 
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whether a classification is truly remedial or a form of racial politics.  Thus, 
Justice O’Connor reasoned, “[e]ven if were we to accept a reading of the 
guarantee of equal protection under which the level of scrutiny varies 
according to the ability of different groups to defend their interests in the 
representative process, heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate . . . in 
this case.”89  She then noted that Richmond’s population was fifty percent 
black, and that five of nine city council members were black.90 
Based on these facts, Justice O’Connor flipped Ely’s theory on its head.  
In this case, Justice O’Connor reasoned that “[t]he concern that a political 
majority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on 
unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to militate for, 
not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny . . . .”91  In other 
words, under the facts of this case, where a black majority City Council 
enacted an ordinance that harmed the interests of Whites to seemingly 
provide an economic boon to its black constituents, Justice O’Connor used 
Ely’s political process theory to imply that the white minority in Richmond 
were a suspect class who needed the courts to protect its rights and interests 
from the “racial tyranny” of the new black political majority.92 
3. The dangers of racial factionalism at the state and local  government
 level 
Having adopted the strict scrutiny standard of review for race conscious 
affirmative action set-asides, Justice O’Connor then applied the standard to 
Richmond’s set-aside and struck it down as violative of equal protection.93  
In doing so, Justice O’Connor portrayed the enactment of the set-aside as 
essentially a power move made by the black majority in Richmond to 
provide government largess to its constituency under the guise of seeking 
to remedy the effects of past discrimination.  Justice O’Connor’s 
application of strict scrutiny to the set-aside in Croson, then, was another 
means of reinforcing the essential plotline of her legal narrative:  that 
African Americans are now a politically powerful interest group, who, 
instead of needing judicial protection, must now have their actions 
carefully scrutinized to ensure that they do not engage in racial politics and 
undermine the rights and interests of white minorities under their power. 
Under the compelling state interest analysis, Justice O’Connor held that 
the Richmond city council failed to “provide the city of Richmond with a 
                                                 
 89. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 495-96. 
 92. See id. at 496 (citing Ely, Reverse Racial Discrimination, supra note 60, at 739 
n.58, who asserts, “[o]f course, it works both ways:  a law that favors Blacks over Whites 
would be suspect if it were enacted by a predominantly Black legislature.”). 
 93. Id. at 511. 
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‘strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was 
necessary’”94 to rectify the present effects of past racial discrimination in 
the Richmond construction industry.  Specifically, Justice O’Connor 
criticized the city council for relying on the disparity between the minority 
population of the city and the number of prime contracts awarded to 
minority firms as evidence of the present effects of past racial 
discrimination.95  For Justice O’Connor, the reliance on such a disparity 
was problematic because such “generalized” evidence could be the basis 
for extending the set-aside “until the percentage of public contracts 
awarded to MBE’s in Richmond mirrored the percentage of minorities in 
the population as a whole.”96 
In other words, if evidence showing that less than one percent of prime 
contracts went to African American bidders even though African 
Americans constitute fifty percent of the population in the city of 
Richmond could be used to justify a set-aside to African American 
contractors of thirty percent, Justice O’Connor’s fear was that such 
evidence could be used to justify a set-aside percentage to mirror the 
population of African Americans within Richmond’s jurisdiction.97  
Moreover, if the population of African Americans and racial minorities 
continued to grow in Richmond, logically, evidence of such a disparity 
could be used to increase the set-aside percentage to mirror the increase in 
the population growth of racial minorities. 
Thus, to prevent a local government from using its population of racial 
minorities as a primary basis for justifying a set-aside targeted for the 
benefit of that racial minority population, Justice O’Connor required that a 
state or local government provide evidence of “identified discrimination 
within its jurisdiction” to justify and prove that it is enacting a set-aside for 
a remedial purpose.98  For Justice O’Connor, if the Court permitted the city 
                                                 
 94. Id. at 500 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986), which 
held that the policy of laying off non-minority teachers before the minority teachers violated 
the Equal Protection Clause because the lay-off policy, whose stated purpose was to provide 
role models for minority students, was not narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose of 
remedying social discrimination). 
 95. Id. at 501. 
 96. Id. at 498.  Furthermore, Justice O’Connor contends that accepting general 
discrimination as a compelling governmental interest would allow local governments to 
favor a minority group in a particular industry with a mere showing of the lack of 
opportunities for the minority group.  Id. at 499. 
 97. See id. at 498 (“[A] generalized assertion on that there has been past discrimination 
in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise 
scope of the injury it seeks to remedy.  It ‘has no logical stopping point.’” (quoting Wygant, 
476 U.S. at 275)). 
 98. Id. at 509.  Justice O’Connor indicated that the city of Richmond would have had a 
sufficiently compelling interest if it produced evidence that minority businesses were being 
systematically excluded from subcontracting opportunities by non-minority contractors.  Id.  
Moreover, the city would have been justified in providing relief to victims of discrimination 
in individual instances where a “racially motivated” contractor refused to hire a minority 
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of Richmond to enact a set-aside based on the evidence it mustered, her 
fear was that the Court would be giving localities the license to engage in 
raw racial group factionalism: 
Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define both the scope of 
injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its effects.  Absent 
such findings, there is a danger that a racial classification is merely . . . a 
form of racial politics.  “[I]f there is no duty to attempt either to measure 
the recovery by the wrong or to distribute that recovery within the 
injured class in an evenhanded way, our history will adequately support a 
legislative preference for almost any ethnic, religious, or racial group 
with the political strength to negotiate ‘a piece of the action’ for its 
members.”99 
In quoting Justice Stevens’ dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick, Justice 
O’Connor used the history of racial oppression against racial minorities as 
a reason to look upon affirmative action programs such as the Richmond 
set-aside with suspicion and skepticism.100  The critical part of the 
quotation is the notion that, in the post civil rights era, a racial group “with 
political strength to negotiate ‘a piece of the action’ for its members” could 
use the history of racial discrimination and exclusion in the United States 
for self-serving purposes.101 
For Justice O’Connor, this use of historical racial discrimination for self-
serving purposes is precisely what happened in Croson.  In her view, the 
Black-controlled Richmond city council used its political strength to 
negotiate “a piece of the action” for the fifty percent Black population of 
Richmond using generalized assertions of past racial discrimination as the 
basis for its raw assertion of interest group racial politics.102  Moreover, the 
possibility that other cities with a substantial racial minority population 
could engage in the same sort of racial politics would seriously undermine 
racial progress towards a colorblind society, because the “dream of a 
Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal 
opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting 
preferences based on inherently immeasurable claims of past wrongs.”103  
Hence, for Justice O’Connor and the other Justices who joined her opinion, 
it was necessary for the Court to impose strict scrutiny on state and local 
                                                                                                                 
subcontractor.  Id. 
 99. Id. at 510-11 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 539 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
 100. See id. at 500 (arguing that, because racial classifications are suspect, legislative 
assurances of good intention do not suffice). 
 101. Id. at 511. 
 102. See id. at 506 (implying that because the city lacked evidence of past discrimination 
against other minorities, the city of Richmond’s purpose in enacting the set-aside program 
was not to remedy societal discrimination against all minorities in the construction industry 
but to benefit Blacks). 
 103. Id. at 505-06.   
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government race conscious affirmative action programs to send a clear 
message to local governments like Richmond that they cannot use 
historical evidence of racial discrimination to justify naked racial politics in 
the present. 
B. Social Reality in Justice Scalia’s Legal Narrative:  Blacks as the 
Dominant Racial and Political Group and Whites as the Disadvantaged 
Racial and Political Group in Richmond 
Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence in Croson forcefully reiterating the 
same themes in Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion.104  Moreover, his 
concurrence helped to shore up a flaw in Justice O’Connor’s political 
process theory analysis.  Political process theory has been used to justify 
special judicial protection only of historically disadvantaged discrete and 
insular minorities in the political process.105  In Croson, however, Justice 
O’Connor gave Whites in Richmond the status of disadvantaged political 
minority, even though, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, 
Whites have not historically been disadvantaged.106  Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence, however, provided a novel rationale for justifying “suspect 
class” status for white minorities in territorial jurisdictions like the city of 
Richmond:  a white minority should be considered a “suspect class” where 
the black political majority has an incentive to “even the score” with 
Whites for the way that Whites had discriminated and oppressed them in 
the past.107  To put it another way, under Justice Scalia’s reasoning, that 
Blacks have been historically discriminated against by Whites in the past is 
a reason to view with suspicion legislation enacted by a black majority 
burdening the rights of a white minority. 
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed with Justice O’Connor’s 
reliance on the historical purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
distinguish between federal uses of race and state and local race-based 
action.108  He went on to state that another “sound distinction between 
federal and state (or local) action based on race rests . . . upon social reality 
and governmental theory.”109  He viewed the Richmond set-aside as an 
illegitimate means to benefit “the dominant political group, which happens 
also to be the dominant racial group.”110  In his view, the social reality is 
                                                 
 104. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 105. See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 58, at 170. 
 106. Croson, 488 U.S. at 533 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 107. See id. at 527-28 (acknowledging that Blacks had suffered more discrimination than 
any other racial group but rejecting the notion that societal discrimination justifies favoring 
one race over another because it would nurture the views that sourced past discrimination). 
 108. See id. at 490-91 (reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment expanded federal 
power while limiting state power). 
 109. Id. at 522. 
 110. Id. at 524. 
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that racial discrimination against a particular group may be carried out with 
greater ease at the state and local level, rather than at the federal level.111  
Justice Scalia cited to the school desegregation cases as evidence of his 
view of social reality.112 
Justice Scalia further supported his view of social reality by relying on 
James Madison’s political theory as explicated in Federalist 10 of the 
Federalist Papers.113  He reasoned that “[a]n acute awareness of the 
heightened danger of oppression from political factions in small, rather 
than large, political units dates to the very beginning of our national 
history.”114  Justice Scalia then cited at length from a passage in Federalist 
10: 
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties 
and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the 
more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the 
smaller the numbers of individuals composing a majority, and the 
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will 
they concert and execute their plan of oppression.  Extend the sphere and 
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less 
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to 
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it 
will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength 
and to act in unison with each other.115 
Thus, according to Madisonian political theory, within an extended 
republic, a greater variety of interests will exist, and the chance is less 
likely that a dominant, permanent majority faction will form.  Within a 
smaller, more homogeneous republic, Madison contends, it is easier for a 
single interest or faction to dominate a legislative body and be able to 
engage in majoritarian tyranny against a minority faction.  In Croson, 
Justice Scalia contended that the prophesy of Madison’s words “came to 
fruition in Richmond in the enactment of a set-aside clearly and directly 
beneficial to the dominant political group, which happens also to be the 
dominant racial group.”116 
Under Justice Scalia’s view, a racial classification enacted at the local 
level requires the closest and most careful level of judicial scrutiny, 
because at the local level, the danger of racial majoritarian tyranny is the 
greatest.117  Within the smaller geographic sphere of Richmond, Blacks, 
although a minority within the state and in the nation, are large enough to 
                                                 
 111. Id. at 523. 
 112. Id. 
 113. James Madison, No. 10, in THE FEDERALIST 82, 84 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 114. Croson, 488 U.S. at 523. 
 115. Id. (quoting Madison, supra note 113, at 82-84). 
 116. Id. at 524. 
 117. Id. at 523. 
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constitute a majority.  This majority, moreover, has been subject to a long 
history of racial discrimination by Whites in Richmond and in Virginia.  
Thus, the black majority has a “common motive to invade the rights”:  its 
belief that “an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should be 
compensated for by discriminating against a white.”118  For Justice Scalia, 
the black majority enacted a set-aside plan that discriminated against the 
new white minority in Richmond, a “plan of oppression” facilitated by the 
structure of local government which, according to Madison and Justice 
Scalia, makes it easier for a political majority to oppress a political 
minority.119  Therefore, when the black dominated city council enacted a 
set-aside seemingly benefiting the black majority while burdening the 
rights of the white minority, Justice Scalia concluded that the enactment of 
the set-aside was a clear and obvious example of a dominant racial and 
political majority oppressing and tyrannizing the weaker racial and political 
minority.120   
C. Justice Marshall’s Dissent and the Historical Response to the 
Majority’s Legal Narrative in Croson 
Justice Marshall wrote the main dissent in the opinion, a dissent in which 
Justices Blackmun and Brennan joined.121  The basic thrust of Justice 
Marshall’s dissent was to criticize the majority for ignoring the city of 
Richmond’s “disgraceful history of public and private racial 
discrimination” in striking down an affirmative action set-aside meant to 
redress the effects of that long history of racial discrimination against 
African Americans.122  While Justice Scalia vigorously contended that the 
black majority Richmond city council enacted the set-aside to “even the 
score”123 against its former white oppressors, Justice Marshall, on the other 
hand, viewed it as “a welcome symbol of racial progress when the former 
capital of the Confederacy acts forthrightly to confront the effects of racial 
discrimination in its midst.”124 
Similarly, liberal and critical commentators were quick to criticize the 
Court for concluding that the long history of racial oppression in this nation 
and in Richmond was irrelevant to a showing of identified past racial 
discrimination.125  Professor Neil Gotanda argued, “[i]f judicial review is to 
                                                 
 118. Id. at 528. 
 119. Id. at 523. 
 120. Id. at 524. 
 121. Id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 529 (refuting the majority’s position that Richmond’s findings were 
inadequate to prove that societal discrimination prevented minorities from “joining or 
participating fully” in the Richmond construction industry). 
 123. Id. at 528. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Color Blindness, History, and the Law, in 
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consider the past and continuing character of racial subordination, then . . . 
[j]udicial review using historical-race should be asymmetric because of the 
fundamentally different histories of Whites and Blacks.”126  Professor 
Patricia Williams sums up eloquently the essential core of the historical 
argument against the Croson decision: 
I cannot but marvel at how, against a backdrop of richly textured facts 
and proof on both local and national scales, in a city where more than 
half the population is black and in which fewer than 1 percent of 
contracts are awarded to minorities or minority-owned businesses, 
interpretative artifice alone allowed this narrow vision that not just that 
30 percent was too great a set-aside, but that there was no proof of 
discrimination.127 
However, the emphasis on past historical discrimination against African 
Americans actually supported and gave even more credence to the 
majority’s concerns about the dangers of racial factionalism and local racial 
politics in Richmond.  In fact, the standard liberal response actually 
supports and feeds into the Court’s concerns about racial factionalism.  If 
Croson is viewed as a case about political process and the dangers of racial 
factionalism at the local level, then it becomes clearer why the historical 
argument used to criticize the Croson Court simply fails to address the 
Court’s policy concerns.  The Croson majority, and in particular Justice 
Scalia, agreed with the dissent that Blacks have historically been subject to 
invidious racial discrimination and oppression.128  The majority and 
dissent, however, drew very different conclusions from that history. For the 
Croson majority, the long and horrific history of racial oppression of 
Blacks was an even further compelling reason to view with suspicion the 
actions of a black controlled local government.129  For the majority, at the 
local level, Blacks not only have the motive to tyrannize Whites but also 
the means and power to do so.  In essence, the core of both Justice 
                                                                                                                 
THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT:  BLACK AMERICANS, U.S. TERRAIN 280, 284-85 (Wahneema 
Lubiano ed., 1997) (contending that the Croson Court’s color-blind approach, without 
regard to historical discrimination, resulted in formal equality, which furthers the 
domination of minorities by majorities in situations of social inequality); Neil Gotanda, A 
Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1991) 
(denouncing formal-race strict scrutiny, as applied by the Croson Court, due to its limiting 
effects on the scope of constitutional governmental remedies available to correct racial 
equality, “thereby perpetuating social advantages for Whites”); Peter Charles Hoffer, “Blind 
to History”  The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits:  Another Look at City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 23 RUTGERS L.J. 271, 279 (1992) (suggesting that the Court’s 
use of a humanistic approach to historical reasoning, which considers a broader context, 
examines proximate causes, and finds deep associations, may have changed the outcome of 
Croson). 
 126. Gotanda, supra note 125, at 49. 
 127. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 106 (1991). 
 128. Croson, 488 U.S. at 527. 
 129. Id. at 500. 
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O’Connor’s and Justice Scalia’s narrative comes down to this “truth”:  the 
Equal Protection Clause does not permit a historically oppressed racial 
group to use its history of racial oppression to discriminate against its 
former oppressor.  As Justice Scalia asserts, “[w]here injustice is the 
game . . . turnabout is not fair play.”130 
Thus, in emphasizing the long history of racial discrimination by white 
Richmond citizens against black Richmond citizens, Justice Marshall’s 
dissent never directly addressed the majority’s concerns regarding reverse 
majoritarian tyranny, and perhaps his dissent ended up only providing 
further fodder for the majority’s conclusion that Whites were now a suspect 
class precisely because Whites in Richmond had historically engaged in 
discriminatory practices against Blacks.  Thus, because of that history, the 
Croson majority believes Whites are now likely to be subject to racial 
retribution by the new black political majority in the guise of ostensibly 
benign legislative enactments purporting to remedy the effects of past 
discrimination. 
The Croson decision, in subjecting state and local government 
affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny, is significant because it 
reflects the ascendance of the colorblindness principle in equal protection 
doctrine.  Thus, liberal constitutional scholars and justices constructed 
arguments against the Croson decision that actually end up supporting, 
rather than undermining, the “plot” of the Croson majority’s legal 
narrative.  Why?  The critiques have been ineffective because they have 
failed to critically examine the spatial assumptions in the Croson majority’s 
legal narrative.  In fact, they, like the Croson majority, all implicitly 
assume that the proper geographic scale for the story is the city of 
Richmond, since the case is about a set-aside enacted by the city of 
Richmond.  Accordingly, for both the majority and dissent, the implicit 
assumption was that places and spaces outside the political boundaries of 
the city of Richmond were simply irrelevant to the competing stories being 
told in the opinion. 
III. CRITIQUING THE SPATIAL ASSUMPTIONS IN THE CROSON NARRATIVE 
In order to effectively critique the Croson majority’s narrative, it is 
necessary to first uncover the spatial assumptions present in the Court’s 
decision.  One key spatial assumption in the Croson majority’s narrative is 
that the relevant geographic scale or setting was the city or local scale.  The 
Court assumed that the narrative was about a local government, the city of 
Richmond, and consequently, the Court restricted the geographic scale of 
                                                 
 130. Id. at 524. 
  
2004] RE-MAPPING EQUAL PROTECTION 1331 
its narrative to the city limits of Richmond.131  In making this geographic 
assumption, the Court effectively made the spaces and places outside the 
city lines of Richmond disappear from the minds of the reader, making the 
reader forget that the city of Richmond is located within a greater 
geographic context. 
However, as argued earlier, the decision to choose a particular 
geographic scale/setting of a story is not a neutral, inconsequential 
decision.  Rather, the geographic setting is integral to the construction of a 
plot, and the plot is the key determinant of a narrative’s meaning.  In fact, 
the spatial construction in the Croson legal narratives was a critical move 
necessary to make the narratives coherent, self-evident, and therefore 
convincing.  Accordingly, the next sections of this Article will examine 
alternative geographic settings for the Croson narratives to reveal the 
consequences of racial inequality and the workings of power that had been 
obscured by the Croson majority’s legal narratives. 
A.  Croson as a Narrative About the National Construction Industry 
As mentioned above, one effective way to uncover the embedded spatial 
constructs in a legal narrative is to start by asking the where question:  
Where are the “characters” in the narrative located?  Where are they from?  
Where are they now?  This section will examine where the plaintiff in 
Croson was from, and in doing so, this section will argue that the local 
geographic scale in the Croson narratives was entirely inappropriate given 
the interstate nature of the construction industry. 
Justice Scalia contended that the set-aside reflected an attempt by the 
dominant black racial and political group in Richmond to “even the score” 
with the white racial and political minority.132  Justice Scalia concluded that 
it was necessary for the Court to strike down the set-aside and impose strict 
scrutiny on state and local government race conscious programs to protect 
minority members like Croson Co. from future acts of injustice.133 
A crucial geographic assumption in Justice Scalia’s story is that this case 
involved a racial majority faction oppressing a racial minority faction 
within the territorial jurisdiction of Richmond.  For Justice Scalia, 
affirmative action “is the means by which Whites might be oppressed in 
those places where Whites are racially outnumbered.”134  For Justice 
Scalia’s narrative to make sense, therefore, the assumption must have been 
                                                 
 131. See id. at 492 (holding that Richmond may take steps to remedy private 
discrimination within its own city boundaries). 
 132. See id. at 524, 528 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Richmond set-aside 
program was enacted by the dominant political group in favor of the same dominant racial 
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 133. Id. at 520, 524. 
 134. Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 402 (1989). 
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that Croson was a company operated by a member of the “outnumbered” 
white racial group in Richmond. 
However, for all the concerns raised by Justice Scalia regarding the 
vulnerability of the white Richmond minority, the irony is that in Croson, 
the plaintiff Croson Co. was not a “citizen” of the city of Richmond.135  
Croson was, and still is, a corporation incorporated in Ohio with its 
principal place of business in Ohio.136  Thus, the Madisonian and process 
theory concerns raised by the Court, in particular by Justice Scalia, simply 
did not apply in Croson.  Croson Co. was not even an individual but a 
multi-locational corporation with bases of operation in multiple states. 
The geographic location of the general contractor was never mentioned 
by any of the justices in Croson, nor did the Court mention this in the 
statement of facts.137  However, once it is understood that the plaintiff, 
Croson Co., was an Ohio corporation, that understanding undermines 
Justice Scalia’s reliance on Madisonian theory to understand the social 
reality of race relations in Richmond.  The political process and 
Madisonian theory relied on by the majority was premised on protecting 
minority individual personal rights, not the rights of corporations.  Croson, 
however, involved a foreign corporation challenging Richmond’s set-aside 
program.  In other words, contrary to the narrative told by Justice Scalia, 
this case did not involve a political majority enacting a policy burdening a 
political minority.  Rather, this case involved a city government regulating 
how it deals with commercial enterprises located throughout the nation.  
Madisonian theory, however, is silent about interstate relations, and is 
silent about the role of corporations in its theory of factions.   
Moreover, the fact that Croson Co. is an out-of-state corporation raises 
serious questions regarding the applicability of Madisonian factional theory 
to corporations.  Corporations defy traditional Madisonian territorial 
jurisdictional factional analysis for two reasons.  One reason why it is 
difficult to apply Madisonian factional theory to corporations is because a 
corporation is a legal fiction and does not have a corporeal existence, and 
so the question of “where is a corporation” is a difficult if not impossible 
question to answer.  In Croson, the plaintiff had a regional manager in the 
Richmond area, and presumably, that regional manager had conducted 
numerous transactions on behalf of Croson Co. with the city of Richmond 
over a period of time.138  Does that fact, therefore, mean that Croson Co. is 
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“in” the city of Richmond and therefore a “citizen” of Richmond?139  
Whatever answer one provides to this question, the main point is that the 
question is not an easy one to answer.  As such, it is difficult to incorporate 
the rights of “corporations” within Madison’s theory of local factions.  
Moreover, to the extent that most general contractors are corporations, it is 
not legally possible to determine whether a corporation “resides” in a city 
such as Richmond because corporations are incorporated at the state level 
and do not technically have a “local” place of incorporation.140 
Additionally, the nature of a city’s procurement practices also makes it 
difficult to apply Madisonian theory to determine if a city engages in 
“tyrannical” procurement practices that burden and invade the rights of the 
city’s minority factions.  The reality is that, as a general practice, a city like 
Richmond does not restrict itself to dealing solely or mostly with general 
contractors located within its jurisdiction.141  In fact, studies of various city 
procurement practices show that the geographic scope of a city’s 
procurement practice extends far beyond its political jurisdictional 
boundaries.  In New York City, for example, a disparity study showed that 
the relevant geographic scope for construction procurement practices was a 
“twelve county, two state area, and a nineteen county, three state area for 
personal and professional services.”142 
Finally, even if we accept Justice Scalia’s logic that this set-aside was 
truly about “evening the score” with Whites in general, and not just white 
Richmond residents, then, because white general contractors located 
outside of Richmond were the ones “oppressed” by the city’s set-aside 
program, it would mean that the black members of the Richmond city 
council enacted this set-aside as a way to “even the score” with white 
people and white-owned businesses throughout the entire United States. 
However, there is very little factual evidence to support the inference 
that the city was truly motivated by a desire to “even the score” with white 
people of the United States.  It is a speculative proposition, and moreover, 
it speaks to a theory of racial factionalism that Madison never envisioned.  
Thus, put in proper geographic perspective, Justice Scalia’s conclusion is 
not supported by social theory and history.  Rather, the social theory and 
history invoked by Justice Scalia was simply irrelevant to the 
circumstances in the case. 
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Yet, even though the Croson decision did not represent a paradigmatic, 
unambiguous example of a majority oppressing a minority within a 
territorial jurisdiction, curiously, even legal scholars supportive of 
affirmative action have not really challenged the narrative constructed by 
Justice Scalia.143  Perhaps the lack of critical analysis of Justice Scalia’s 
Madisonian reasoning stems from the power of his narrative, a narrative so 
compelling and so resonant with dominant beliefs regarding the dangers of 
majoritarian tyranny, that the “truth” of Justice Scalia’s story seemed 
unassailable and self-evident, making it easy to forget to ask simple 
questions such as where was the plaintiff really from, which, as I argue, 
opens up an avenue for critiquing and revealing the ways in which a legal 
narrative does not correspond with and accurately represent the reality of a 
situation. 
B. Croson as a Narrative About the Commonwealth of Virginia 
Even though the rights of the white minority in Richmond were not 
directly implicated in Croson, the general question still needs to be 
addressed:  Does the white Richmond minority have reasons to fear that the 
black political majority has the incentive and means to invade its rights?  
Does the general theoretical possibility of black majoritarian tyranny at the 
local level justify the Court’s decision to impose strict scrutiny on state and 
local government’s race conscious measures?  This section will examine 
the Croson situation by locating it within the state political scale instead of 
focusing solely on the local scale.  In other words, instead of examining 
Croson as a case involving a pure “local” matter, it will examine it as case 
involving the relationship between a state and one of its local governments.   
1. Local governments as creatures of state law 
Under well-settled Virginia state law, local governments such as the city 
of Richmond are subordinate political subdivisions of the state.144  As 
political subdivisions, local governments exist as a creature, a delegate, and 
an agent of the state.145  As a creature of the state, a local government 
derives its existence and power solely from the state and is completely 
                                                 
 143. See Jed Rubenfield, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 466 (1997) (accepting 
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subject to plenary state power and control.146  As a delegate of the state, a 
local government possesses only those powers conferred on it by the 
state.147  As an agent of the state, a local government exercises its delegated 
powers at the local level to further state interests.148  Thus, under this 
formal view, “a local government is like a state administrative agency, 
serving the state in its narrow area of expertise.”149 
The federal constitutional status of local government is predicated on its 
status as a subordinate political subdivision of the state.150  Local 
governments have no independent constitutional status or rights.  
Therefore, because all local exercises of power are performed to further the 
state’s interests, local government action is considered “state” action.151 
2. The inconsistent treatment of local governments in constitutional law 
Even though black-letter law exists on the legal and constitutional status 
of local government, Professor Richard Ford asserts that “local government 
exists in a netherworld of shifting and indeterminate legal status.”152  Ford 
argues that “local government law oscillates between two competing 
conceptions of local government.”153  The first conception is the traditional 
notion of local government as a subordinate political subdivision of the 
state.154  The second conception reflects a view of local government as an 
autonomous political community formed by people of the same values and 
interests.155  Within this view, local governments are decentralized sites for 
democratic participation.  Local government as autonomous political 
community invokes visions of New England town meetings.156  This 
conception “belies the conception of local government as a delegate of the 
state and instead conjures up the notion of a state within a state.”157 
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While Ford argues that local government doctrine “oscillates” between 
the “subordinate political subdivisions of the state” view and the 
“autonomous political community” view,158  the case law provides no 
discernible pattern or principle from which to predict when a court, in a 
particular case, will rely on one conception of local government over 
another. 
While any case, taken in isolation, may appear to be governed by a 
singular and coherent set of principles or a holistic logic, the cases as a 
whole reflect a deep ambivalence towards the proper role of local 
government in a society ostensibly committed to popular sovereignty, 
individual rights, and the rule of law.159 
The doctrinal “oscillation” between two competing visions of local 
government serves as a way to manipulate the spatial or geographic scale 
of the legal story a court tells in order to justify a particular decision.  
Specifically, in Croson, in order to construct its narrative about local 
government tyranny, the Court ignored the legal conception of a city as a 
subordinate arm of the state.  More specifically, the Court had to ignore the 
holding of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that, in enacting 
the set-aside, the city of Richmond acted to further the state’s interests in 
promoting diversity in the construction industry.160 
In imposing strict scrutiny, the Court focused solely on the perceived 
localized racial interests of the black city council in Richmond.161  Had the 
Court been consistent in treating the city of Richmond as a state entity, it 
would have focused its equal protection analysis not on the black majority 
city council of Richmond, but on the white majority-controlled 
Commonwealth of Virginia.  Once the city of Richmond is properly located 
as a subordinate agent of the Commonwealth of Virginia, it is harder to 
argue that the federal courts needed to intervene into state-local 
government affairs in order to protect vulnerable whites from local racial 
majoritarian tyranny. 
3. The Fourth Circuit’s state law holding—the city of Richmond as an
 agent of the state of Virginia 
The Fourth Circuit held that the Commonwealth of Virginia enacted the 
set-aside to further the public interest in promoting inclusion of minority 
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and women owned businesses in government procurement transactions.162  
In other words, the city of Richmond was acting as an administrative arm 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia to effectuate the interests of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia in advancing racial equality through 
affirmative action. 
The Fourth Circuit Court, in deciding the constitutionality of the set-
aside, first dealt with the threshold state law question:  whether Richmond 
had authority under state law to enact the set-aside.163  In holding that 
Richmond had the requisite authority to enact the set-aside, the court 
concluded that the set-aside advanced the state’s interest in promoting 
minority participation in government construction contracts.164  In 
conducting its analysis, the court applied Virginia state and local 
government law.  Virginia limits the power of its local governments to 
express grants of statutory authority.165  The scope of a local government’s 
authority is determined according to the judicial doctrine of Dillon’s 
Rule.166  Dillon’s Rule states, “[L]ocal governing bodies have only those 
powers that are expressly granted, those that are fairly implied from 
expressly granted powers, and those that are essential and 
indispensable.”167 
Plaintiff, Croson Co., contended that Richmond’s authority to enact the 
set-aside could not be “fairly implied” from powers expressly granted to 
localities by Virginia.168  It made two arguments to support this claim.  
First, Croson argued that the power was not “fairly implied,” since the 
“Plan is not ‘based on competitive principles,’” as required by the Virginia 
Procurement Statute.169  The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, 
reasoning that past discrimination produced anti-competitive effects for 
minority businesses.170  Therefore, by encouraging minority-owned 
businesses to enter a market where they had previously been absent, the 
set-aside actually promoted competition.171 
                                                 
 162. See Croson, 779 F.2d at 190 (asserting that Richmond’s plan effectively remedied 
past discrimination to promote current diversity). 
 163. See id. at 184-85 (stating that Croson Co. contended that Richmond’s plan was ultra 
vires and therefore, invalid). 
 164. See id. (indicating that, because the plan remedied past discrimination, it was 
constitutionally valid). 
 165. See id. at 185 (contending that the ordinance was valid only if authorized under the 
Dillon Rule); see also Note, Dillon’s Rule:  The Case for Reform, 68 VA. L. REV. 693, 693 
(1982) [hereinafter Dillon’s Rule] (indicating that Dillon’s Rule presents a narrow scope of 
local power). 
 166. Dillon’s Rule, supra note 165, at 693. 
 167. Croson, 779 F.2d at 185. 
 168. See id. (presenting Croson Co.’s argument that Richmond had no power to enact the 
plan under the Dillon Rule). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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Second, Croson argued that Richmond’s authority to enact the set-aside 
cannot be fairly implied from expressly granted powers because the set-
aside was contrary to the public policy of Virginia.172  The Court rejected 
this argument, noting that under the section 11-48 of the Virginia 
Procurement Statute, all public bodies in Virginia were required to 
“facilitate the participation of small businesses and businesses owned by 
women and minorities in procurement transactions.”173 
If the set-aside comported with the state’s mandate that government 
contracts be awarded on a competitive basis, and, if the set-aside advanced 
the state’s interest in promoting minority participation in government 
procurement practice, then the Court seemed to have focused its strict 
scrutiny analysis on the wrong government entity.  Once we view 
Richmond as a state law entity advancing the state’s interest, the analysis 
would not focus on the Richmond City Council and its black majority, but 
rather, would focus on the state legislature and its dominant white majority. 
Under political process analysis, if there is a process defect, the process 
defect is in the state legislative process for authorizing one of its 
subdivisions to engage in unlawful racial politics.  And, applying Ely’s 
theory to the facts, there is little danger of a process defect because the 
white majority in the Virginia state legislature is not likely to allow a black 
controlled subdivision to invidiously discriminate against Whites in 
Richmond.  This situation is the classic affirmative action scenario that Ely 
poses:  a white political majority disadvantaging itself to benefit a racial 
minority.  In this light, the Madisonian political process theory’s fear of 
local government racial tyranny becomes more apparent than real.  State 
law mechanisms exist to control local government action.  Dillon’s Rule, 
for example, developed as an attempt to curb perceived local government 
corruption.174 
4. Justice O’Connor’s inconsistent treatment of the city of  Richmond 
in Croson 
In the Supreme Court’s decision in Croson, however, the Court ignored 
both the Fourth Circuit’s and its own treatment of the city of Richmond as 
a state entity in deciding to impose strict scrutiny on the local government 
set-aside.  In fact, the Court oscillated, without any reasoning or 
justification, between the two competing conceptions of local government 
                                                 
 172. See id. at 185-86 (presenting Croson Co.’s argument that the plan violated public 
policy because a “public body” discriminates on the basis of race). 
 173. Id. at 186. 
 174. See Williams, supra note 145, at 84 (noting that Dillon wanted to “limit city power” 
by arguing “cities had no inherent sovereignty”). 
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within the same opinion by inconsistently treating the city of Richmond 
simultaneously as a state agency and as an autonomous city-state. 
In distinguishing the congressional set-aside upheld in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick175 from the Richmond city council set-aside at issue in Croson, 
Justice O’Connor repeatedly emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause 
acts as a limit on state power.176  The City of Richmond argued that 
Fullilove authorizes state and local governments to enact race-conscious 
remedial programs.177  Justice O’Connor rejected the city’s argument.178  
Justice O’Connor reasoned that Congress has greater latitude in fashioning 
a remedy for past discrimination against racial minorities because Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress broad enforcement 
powers.179  Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers the 
federal government with broad remedial powers to enforce the Equal 
Protection Clause but Section One acts as a limit on state action regarding 
matters of race.180 Here, Justice O’Connor sought to distinguish the 
Richmond set-aside from the Congressional set-aside upheld as 
constitutional in Fullilove.181 
Thus, in treating the city of Richmond as a “state” for constitutional 
purposes, Justice O’Connor relied on a conception of local governments as 
administrative arms of the state.  This move is necessary because the Equal 
Protection Clause explicitly limits state power.  Local governments are also 
subject to the Equal Protection Clause because, for constitutional purposes, 
the local government is a part of the state, and its actions are considered an 
exercise of state power.182  Accordingly, Justice O’Connor emphasized that 
the city of Richmond is “a state entity which has state-law authority to 
address discriminatory practices within local commerce under its 
jurisdiction.”183 
                                                 
 175. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 176. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-92. 
 177. Id. at 486. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 490. 
 180. Id. at 486-93. 
 181. Id. at 490-91.  In 1977, Congress enacted the MBE provision of the Local Public 
Works Act.  The Act required that ten percent of the federal funds granted for local public 
works projects must be used by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies 
from businesses owned and controlled by MBE’s (defined to include Blacks, Hispanics, 
Asians, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts).  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 454 (1980). 
 182. See Avery v. Midland, 390 U.S. 474, 479-80 (1968) (“The Equal Protection Clause 
reaches the exercise of state power however manifested, whether exercised directly or 
through subdivisions of the State.”); see also Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I, supra note 
146, at 87 (noting that, although the Equal Protection Clause reaches only exercises of state 
power, a local government’s status as a political subdivision of the state allows for the 
application of equal protection to local government action). 
 183. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492. 
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The Court also relied on the city of Richmond’s status as a state entity, 
acting on behalf of state interests, in distinguishing the Richmond set-aside 
from the race-based layoff plan struck down in Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education.184  In Wygant, a plurality on the Court applied strict scrutiny to 
a local school board’s race-based lay-off program.185  The Court held that, 
under strict scrutiny, the local school board had to show that it engaged in 
prior racial discrimination in its hiring practices in order to implement a 
race-conscious plan.186  Justice O’Connor, in Croson, distinguished the 
local school board from the Richmond City Council, holding that the City 
of Richmond did not need to show that it had engaged in prior 
discrimination in its procurement practices.187  The difference between the 
city of Richmond in Croson, and the local school board in Wygant, is that 
Richmond was considered a state entity and therefore had the power to 
address discriminatory practices within its jurisdiction.188 
Thus, in distinguishing Wygant from Croson, Justice O’Connor 
recognized the well-settled legal principle that local governments act as 
delegates or entities of the state, and specifically that Richmond’s local 
interests are essentially state interests.189  Yet, in Part III of Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion, where she begins her equal protection analysis of the 
set-aside, there is no mention of any possible state interest in authorizing 
Richmond to enact the set-aside.  She ignores her characterization of 
Richmond as a state entity and treats Richmond as a sovereign city-state 
that engages in legislative action solely for its own local purposes.   
If Richmond is viewed as an autonomous, state-like entity, the dangers 
of racial politics are enhanced because there do not seem to be any 
structural “checks” on potential local abuses of power.  Accordingly, the 
need to subject local government set-asides to strict scrutiny seems 
compelling and necessary.  However, once we foreground the legal 
conception of local government in the equal protection analysis, political 
process and Madisonian theory do not support the Court’s reasoning.  
Justice O’Connor’s oscillation between the two competing conceptions of 
local government diverts our attention away from Richmond’s 
constitutional status as a subordinate political subdivision of the state and 
the existence of state law checks on local government power. 
If Justice O’Connor had consistently treated the city of Richmond as an 
entity of the state, she would have acknowledged that, because the 
                                                 
 184. Id. at 492 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). 
 185. 476 U.S. at 280. 
 186. Id. at 277-78. 
 187. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Ford, Boundaries, supra note 152, at 1862 (arguing that the view of local 
governments as delegates of the states does not provide them with any autonomy). 
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Richmond set-aside was legally authorized by state law, according to 
Dillon’s Rule, she would have had to treat the set-aside as a program 
enacted pursuant to and consistent with the state of Virginia’s policies and 
interests.  Once seen from that perspective, arguably, from a political 
process standpoint, the black majority on the Richmond City Council 
should have been viewed as “an agent” of the white majority in terms of 
population and in terms of the racial composition of the Virginia state 
legislature. 
Of course, the mere existence of installed institutional checks does not 
automatically protect members of a jurisdiction from majoritarian tyranny.  
As critical race and legal scholars have vigorously and convincingly 
argued, formal legal protection against racial discrimination does not 
necessarily translate into substantive protections against racial 
discrimination.190  Similarly, one could argue that the state-law checks on 
local government tyranny may themselves be “malfunctioning,” and that 
the interests of white minorities in localities like Richmond may not be 
fully taken into account by the state-wide white majority. 
However, the critical point for purposes of this Article is that  whether 
local white numerical minorities need federal judicial protection from black 
local majorities is not a question that can be summarily answered, from a 
political process standpoint, by merely looking at which racial group is the 
numerical majority in city government.  Justice O’Connor’s misapplication 
of Professor Ely’s political process theory still begs the question:  Are 
Blacks now in actuality the dominant racial and political group in cities like 
Richmond, and do, therefore, white minorities need federal judicial 
protection in order to be protected from potential acts of black majoritarian 
tyranny? 
C. Croson as a Narrative About the Richmond Metropolitan Area 
This section will examine the nature of a city’s substantive political 
power by analyzing a critical theme in the Croson legal narrative:  That 
regardless of the city’s formal status as a state entity, because Blacks now 
are a numerical majority on the Richmond City Council, Blacks are now 
the dominant racial and political group in Richmond.191  This Section 
contends, however, that once black political power in the city of Richmond 
is analyzed in the context of urban-suburban relations, black control of 
                                                 
 190. See, e.g., id. at 1843-1921 (arguing that despite civil rights reform, local 
government policy and private actors work together to create an ongoing practice of actual 
physical segregation that continues to disempower historically powerless minority 
communities). 
 191. 488 U.S. at 524. 
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formal political power in Richmond is actually evidence of the continuing 
political and socioeconomic powerlessness of African Americans. 
The Court recognized the demographic change in the city of Richmond 
from majority white to majority black.192 The continuing, actual political 
powerlessness experienced by African Americans in Richmond becomes 
clear only when a simple question about geography/demography is asked.  
Neither the majority nor the dissent raised this question:  How did Blacks 
end up becoming a majority in the city of Richmond?  In asking this 
question, the presumption is that where people are is of great social 
significance.  Thus, when critically examining a legal narrative, it is always 
useful to ask how the people who are part of the legal narrative ended up 
where they did.  This simple question opens up the Croson analysis from 
its restricted geographic setting, the city of Richmond, and directs it to an 
analysis of race relations between Whites and Blacks in the Richmond 
metropolitan area. 
1. How did Blacks become a racial majority in the city of Richmond? 
The rise of the black majority in Richmond occurred for primarily one 
reason—the outward-migration of Whites from the city to the Richmond 
suburbs.193  Specifically, the election of black mayors and city council 
members throughout cities in the United States reflect the historical trend 
of Whites moving from the city to the suburbs.194  In Richmond, beginning 
in the 1960s, white residents exercised their exit option.  A similar pattern 
occurred throughout the country, contributing to the problems of central 
cities such as Richmond.195  In Richmond, white residents used their exit 
option not to escape local racial politics, but to escape from the court 
ordered racial integration of public schools.196  The rise of black majorities 
                                                 
 192. See id. at 479. 
 193. See CHRISTOPHER SILVER & JOHN V. MOESER, THE SEPARATE CITY:  BLACK 
COMMUNITIES IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1940-1968 42 (1995) (explaining that Whites began 
moving West from the city in the 1940s, establishing homogenous suburban neighborhoods, 
while Blacks began to predominate census tracks in most areas of central Richmond). 
 194. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, JR. & PHILIP J. MERANTO, ELECTING BLACK MAYORS:  
POLITICAL ACTION IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY 337 (1977) (concluding that black leaders 
inherit their cities’ problems when white leaders and residents move away from the central 
city, yet black leaders lack the economic resources to deal with these problems effectively 
as a result of the flight of a large number of the cities’ middle-class citizens). 
 195. See SILVER & MOESER, supra note 193, at 167 (observing that post-1960s, a 
population loss resulted in a weakening economy, drastic drops in home ownership and a 
substantial decline in the supply of habitable housing in Richmond). 
 196. See Robert Pratt, Simple Justice Denied:  The Supreme Court’s Retreat from School 
Desegregation in Richmond, Virginia, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 709, 710 (1993) (stating that Whites 
were able to prevent de facto integration through passive resistance techniques, but by the 
time of court-ordered busing in 1970, Whites had already begun to exit Richmond in large 
numbers).  See generally Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 325 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Va. 1971) 
(holding that attendance figures may be used to determine if a Richmond school integration 
plan is working in practice and not simply on paper). 
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in central cities, which serve as the basis of political power for black 
political officials, therefore, does not reflect black electoral influence and 
socioeconomic gain, but more accurately reflects the trend of “white flight” 
from the central cities to the suburbs and the resulting predominance of 
poor black citizens within these central cities.197 
The consequences of “white flight” from the central city of Richmond 
have been dramatic.  The city of Richmond has shrunk in population by 
nineteen percent since 1970, and in 1996, Richmond’s population dipped 
below 200,000.198  In stark contrast, the three adjacent, predominantly 
white Richmond area counties have doubled in population, showing a 
growth in 220,000 new residents.199  By the mid-1990s, the attrition of 
Whites from the city had led to a black majority that had grown from fifty 
percent in the mid-70s to nearly sixty percent in the new millennium.200  
Thus, the rise to political power by Blacks in Richmond was primarily 
through attrition of Whites rather than gains in black population.201  
Because the socioeconomic health of a city is reflected by population gain 
and economic growth,202 such a population trend was a major signal that 
the city of Richmond was in distress. 
While the metropolitan area’s population growth mirrors its economic 
growth, the city of Richmond’s population decline mirrors its economic 
decline.  From 1979 to 1994, total employment opportunities in the 
Richmond metropolitan area increased by 34%.203  During that same 
period, total employment opportunities in the city of Richmond declined by 
6%, representing a loss of 11,000 jobs.204  In 1979, 53% of all jobs in the 
Richmond metropolitan area were located in the city of Richmond.205  By 
1994, only 37% of the jobs were located in Richmond.206  And between 
1980 and 1993, the time period when the set-aside was enacted, 90% of 
business investment in the metropolitan area was in the suburbs.207  In 
1980, white median household income in the city was 42% higher than 
                                                 
 197. Pratt, supra note 196, at 710, 723. 
 198. DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 27 (1995). 
 199. Id. 
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 201. See id. at 27 (identifying a cycle where a rise to black political dominance traps 
poor Blacks in cities of declining economic opportunity while simultaneously accelerating 
the flight of middle-class residents). 
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DISPATCH, July 14, 1996, at F1. 
 204. Id. 
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black median household income.208  Ten years later, in 1990, white median 
household income in the city was 65% higher than black median household 
income.209  Moreover, by 1990, over 63% of all the poor in the Richmond 
metropolitan area resided within the city of Richmond.210 
With regard to the state of Richmond public schools, in 1954, white 
children constituted 57% of the Richmond city public school population.211  
By 1989, Blacks constituted more than 87% of the public school population 
and Whites only 13%.212  Presently, black children constitute 95% of the 
public school population in the Richmond city schools.213  These statistics 
show that school segregation has increased over the past several decades.  
Moreover, the segregation is occurring on both a race and a class level, as 
the children in the Richmond public schools tend to also be low-income 
students.214 
Once the geographic context of Richmond’s population is understood, 
the way in which Blacks became a majority in Richmond raises questions 
about whether the black rise to power in Richmond, and other central cities 
in the nation, is consistent with the belief that racial progress has advanced 
in a steady, linear fashion.215  Since the late 1960s, while the Richmond 
metropolitan area has been flourishing, the city of Richmond has been 
dying.  Instead of moving into a position of power, Richmond’s black 
community has obtained political control of a depreciating asset.216 
Richard Hatcher, the first African American mayor of Gary, Indiana, 
recognizes the “paradox” of black political gain in America.217  
Specifically, the number of black elected officials grew from two to three 
hundred in 1972 to over 6,000 by 1989.218  Despite such gains in black 
political power, however, the economic status of black communities during 
                                                 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Pratt, supra note 196, at 710. 
 212. Id.; Jennifer E. Spreng, Scenes from the Southside:  A Desegregation Drama in Five 
Acts, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 327, 390 (1997). 
 213. Pratt, supra note 196, at 710. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See NELSON, JR. & MERANTO, supra note 194, at 337 (countering a theory of black 
political dominance and alternatively maintaining that the demographic conditions that 
result in an increase of black political power may also restrict black leaders’ abilities to 
govern effectively). 
 216. RUSK, supra note 198, at 27; see SILVER & MOESER, supra note 193, at 166-69 
(asserting that Richmond in the 1990s “lacked the means to attract and to sustain population 
densities necessary to support vital urban institutions”). 
 217. See Richard Hatcher, Conclusion to RACE, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:  
COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES 175 (James Jennings ed., 1992) (noting that political power in 
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this period has continued to decline.219  Moreover, the economic status of 
African Americans residing within territorial jurisdictions politically 
controlled by African American political leaders has worsened.220 
The worsening socioeconomic conditions of African Americans residing 
in localities ruled by black political leaders are not due to a failure of 
political will but are the result of structural conditions affecting the vast 
majority of localities under African American control.  The phenomenon of 
“white flight” not only has contributed to the socioeconomic distress of 
African Americans residing in a central city like Richmond, but also has 
represented a form of geopolitical power—a form of political power that 
challenges formal, liberal territorial conceptions of political power.  The 
power of “geographic exit” helps to explain the structural factors that make 
it very difficult for African American political leaders of cities like 
Richmond to engage in measures to remedy the socioeconomic conditions 
of their African American constituents. 
Once urban-suburban race relations in Richmond and other American 
metropolitan areas are understood as structured by the workings of the 
power of geographic exit, a seeming “paradox” emerges regarding the 
nature of political power in the United States.  For African Americans in 
particular, the attainment of political power is no longer a means of 
achieving socioeconomic power.  In other words, there no longer is a 
positive, mutually reinforcing relationship between formal political gain 
and socioeconomic gain.  In fact, the inverse is true:  At the local level, 
African Americans’ hold on formal political power now depends on their 
continual socioeconomic distress and intense socioeconomic racial 
segregation.  Moreover, at the local level, the threat of geographic exit 
gives both the white Richmond suburban majority and the white Richmond 
city minority the ability to influence and control the city’s policymaking.  
This further undermines black substantive political power. 
2. The threat of jurisdictional exit/entry as power 
In order to fully understand how the workings of geographic exit help to 
structure urban-suburban geopolitical relations, it is necessary to discuss 
the political and economic theory that explains how exit operates as 
political power.221  How does the threat of jurisdictional exit operate as 
                                                 
 219. Id. at 175-76. 
 220. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 153-60 (4th 
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political power?  A person or a group has power in the political process of 
territorial jurisdiction X by virtue of that person’s ability to exit territorial 
jurisdiction X and enter another territorial jurisdiction.  In the local 
government context, a person in Richmond, for example, has power to 
influence Richmond politics if city officials believe that she may leave 
Richmond if the city government fails to adequately consider her interests. 
There are several key aspects to the power of exit.  First, a person or 
group of persons are politically powerful by virtue of their ability to exit, if 
and only if that person is someone a territorial jurisdiction wants to keep as 
a member.222  Such members typically are valuable to the city for 
economic, social, and political reasons.223  Thus, jurisdictional exit 
empowers only those persons or groups who already possess a strong 
degree of political and socioeconomic power. 
In contrast, the ability to exit a jurisdiction offers little political power to 
those who are politically, economically, and socially weak.224  Not 
everyone is equally empowered by the ability to exit a jurisdiction.  For 
example, a homeless person cannot use the threat of jurisdictional exit as 
leverage in the political process.  The reason is obvious—a territorial 
jurisdiction typically wants the homeless person to leave, and thus a 
homeless person cannot rely on threats of leaving as a political bargaining 
tool. 
Second, the exit option turns into a form of political power for a valuable 
member of a jurisdiction only when it is feasible and practical for that 
member to enter another jurisdiction.225  If one withdraws from 
membership in an organization, and if membership serves a vital, necessary 
function, then exit is possible “only if the same relationship can be 
reestablished with another [jurisdiction].”226  Exit, therefore, is a viable 
                                                                                                                 
(detailing how exit is a powerful tool to express displeasure within a societal or 
organizational relationship); see also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET 
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 222. See generally HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, supra note 221, at 23 (explaining, in the market 
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 225. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 221, at 78 (stating that exercising the power 
of withdrawal from one organization is only possible when that person is wanted by another 
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 226. Id. 
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option only “on the availability of choice, competition, and well-
functioning markets.”227 
Third, when an already powerful person or group actually exits from a 
jurisdiction, that person not only empowers herself but also simultaneously 
disempowers others.228  When the exit option is viable, those most able to 
use their voice and prevent a decline in an organization are the first to 
leave.  The result is a deterioration in the conditions of the firm that has lost 
its “connoisseur members.”  It is those members, for whom exit is not a 
feasible option, that suffer.229  They suffer because the loss of the most 
valuable members of the organization correspond to a loss of power, 
leverage, and influence. 
Thus, as geographer Doreen Massey argues, a person who exercises the 
power of exit actually disempowers those people that she left behind.230 
For it does seem that mobility, and control over mobility, both reflects 
and reinforces power.  It is not simply a question of unequal distribution, 
that some people move more than others, and that some have more 
control than others.  It is that the mobility and control of some groups 
can actively weaken other people.  Differential mobility can weaken the 
leverage of the already weak.231 
Fourth, the power of exit is a very powerful form of political power at 
the local geographic level.232  Because local governments are 
geographically smaller than state or national governmental units, it is much 
more feasible and practical for a person to exit or move from one local 
jurisdiction to another.233  Moreover, in the United States, the vast number 
of local governmental units provide individuals with numerous exit 
options.234 
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3.   The power of exit and Madisonian theory revisited—the phenomenon  
 of the white minority tyrannizing the weak black political majority 
Once we view the threat of exit as a form of political power within the 
context of the city of Richmond, the traditional Madisonian view of 
majority-minority relations gets flipped on its head, as will be shown 
below.  The power of exit gives both outsiders and political minorities the 
ability to “tyrannize” a weak political majority.235 
In Richmond and other American cities, the historically and 
geographically specific conditions that led to the election of black mayors 
and city council members simultaneously created economic and social 
constraints that restricted black political leaders’ ability to govern 
effectively.236  Specifically, the geographic movement of Whites from city 
to suburb and the continuing threat of future “white flight” has had a 
devastating socioeconomic effect on the poor African Americans remaining 
in Richmond.  When white middle-class residents leave the cities for the 
suburbs, they take with them the cities’ most valuable taxable assets.  Thus, 
black mayors are faced with an increased demand for government services 
yet lack the basic fiscal resources to effect change within their 
communities.237  As political scientists, William Nelson and Philip 
Meranto, observed in 1977: 
It is undoubtedly true that in the foreseeable future most black mayors 
will be elected in dead or dying cities . . . .  These cities will bear only a 
modest resemblance to the financially secure governmental structures 
captured by white ethnics.  The election of black mayors signals instead 
the onset of black takeover of bankrupt cities consumed by social 
conflict, physical decay, and enormous financial problems.238 
The white minority in Richmond, rather than being oppressed by its 
numerical minority, actually wields tremendous leverage and influence 
over city policies because the white minority in Richmond is comprised 
predominantly of middle class residents.  In fact, because Whites within the 
city of Richmond and within the suburbs have political power flowing from 
their ability to exit or to threaten to exit, the Richmond City Council 
policies have a bias in favor of the interests of Whites in Richmond and 
Whites in the Richmond suburbs, and a bias against the interests of low-
income African Americans living in the city.239  The city has a strong 
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economic incentive to keep middle class citizens within its borders because 
such residents help to preserve the city’s property tax base.  Moreover, 
white neighborhoods have higher property value than black neighborhoods 
and thus, a black controlled city council has an economic incentive to keep 
white middle class residents residing within the city.240  Thus, the 
Richmond government actually has an economic incentive to enact policies 
favorable to the interests of the white middle class to ensure that it does not 
use its exit option and move out to the suburbs. 
Why?  At the local level, especially for poor central cities like 
Richmond, the highest priority for the city government is to protect and 
expand the tax base.241  That tax base is most threatened by the possibility 
of geographic exit by businesses and middle class residents from the city of 
Richmond to the suburbs.  White Richmond area business and political 
leaders exercised and continue to exercise enormous de-facto political 
power and influence because the city council operates under the constant 
threat that businesses and middle class residents would exit the city if the 
city engaged in any sort of policy that would hurt the interests of businesses 
and the middle class.  Moreover, if the white middle class exit from 
Richmond, it would exist along with its assets and capital, and the result 
would be a dramatic decrease in the city’s tax base. 
The threat and power of exit at the local level provides strong incentives 
to make sure that a city like Richmond enacts favorable policies to prevent 
its more economically valuable residents from leaving the city.  As Richard 
Briffault observes, “[c]ontemporary cities, as a rule, do not engage in 
innovative re-distributive programs, not because they lack the legal 
authority, but rather because they fear that initiating such programs would 
cause residential and commercial taxpayers to depart.”242 
During the 1980s, the black city council, rather than acting against the 
interests of Whites on several policy issues, actually aligned itself with the 
interests of white suburban business interests at the expense of the interests 
of poor Blacks in Richmond.243  As one historian contends, under black 
leadership, the focus of city policies remained on pursuing white middle 
class, business, and suburban interests rather than the interests of low-
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income African Americans.244  The focus of the city council was on 
restoring “economic superiority to the central city and to encourage the 
return of the [mostly white] middle class [to Richmond], if only as 
visitors.”245  Downtown redevelopment continued to be the central focus of 
city council policies, even under black leadership. 
Thus, despite the fears of the Croson majority, the city of Richmond was 
acting in concert with and on behalf of the interests of white middle class 
business and political elites, and not engaging in local racial tyranny.  
Moreover, the focus of city policy has been on the redevelopment of 
downtown to attract business and white suburbanites, at the expense of 
policies that would directly help its own African American citizens.246  For 
example, in 1982, the city council diverted $1.25 million in federal funds 
intended for community development to provide seed funding for the 
Richmond Renaissance downtown revitalization project.247 Seen in this 
light, the enactment of the set-aside seems like a rather modest effort by the 
city council to enact a policy that focused on the economic interests of 
African Americans.248  Therefore, when the politics of Richmond are 
analyzed within the geographic context of Richmond metropolitan politics 
and in the context of the threat that geographic exit poses to the central city 
of Richmond, the set-aside in Croson looks less like a “power grab” by 
Blacks, and more like a modest attempt by the black city council to address 
the problems of socioeconomic inequality among Blacks. 
The de-linking between political power and economic power is made 
stark by a 1986 study examining the socioeconomic characteristics of forty-
three medium-sized cities in the United States.249  That study revealed that 
Richmond was both the richest and poorest city among the cities 
examined.250  The richest, most affluent neighborhood of all forty-three 
cities was Richmond’s predominantly white, West End neighborhood, 
while the second poorest neighborhoods among all forty-three cities were 
Richmond’s predominantly African American inhabited neighborhoods.251 
Once the set-aside is put in context of urban-suburban relations in the 
Greater Richmond Metropolitan Area, regardless of the “motives” for the 
set-aside, the operational purpose is clear—to stem the flow of jobs and 
industry out of the city, and to foster economic development within 
Richmond.  Moreover, in that geographic context, the Croson Court’s 
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assertions regarding the “dominant political and racial group in Richmond” 
are exposed as assertions without any basis in reality.  
The Croson legal narratives, however, by circumscribing the geographic 
scale to the city limits of Richmond, hid and obscured the workings of 
power that flow across jurisdictional lines, and essentially rendered 
invisible the phenomenon of suburban-city political-economic conflict.  
Political power typically is defined as the “capacity to coerce others 
legitimately into doing your will.”252  When this definition of power is 
placed within the context of territorial jurisdiction, power can be further 
defined as a “monopoly of control exercised equally over all places within 
a given territory by a dominant social group . . . .”253  John Agnew believes 
that the traditional relationship between space and power is underpinned by 
three geographical assumptions: 
(1) that states have an exclusive power within their territories as 
represented by the concept of sovereignty; (2) that domestic and foreign 
affairs are essentially separate realms in which different rules obtain; and 
(3) that the boundaries of a state define the boundaries of society, so that 
the latter is ‘contained’ by the former. 
These assumptions reinforce one another to produce “a state-centered 
view of power in which the space occupied by states is seen as fixed, as 
if for all time.254 
The conventional liberal view of power, therefore, “sees power as 
flowing from a single (sovereign) source, such as the state.”255  Moreover, 
the conventional liberal view presumes that a sovereign state has a 
monopoly on power, and that such power is restricted to and defined by the 
“block of space” under its jurisdictional or territorial control.256  Under this 
view, jurisdictional boundaries act as a “geographic container” of sovereign 
governmental power.257  In addition, under this view, “Jurisdictional 
boundaries also act as a container of all social and political 
organization.”258  In other words, when we examine politics and race 
relations in the city of Richmond from a conventional understanding of 
power, we assume that “the boundaries of the state are also the boundaries 
of whatever social or political process we might be interested in.  Other 
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geographic scales of thinking or analysis are thereby precluded.”259  
Instead, the conventional conception of power views the world as 
comprised of territorial actors achieving their goals through the formal 
political control of space.260 
Under such a conventional view of political power, the way to control a 
“block of space” requires obtaining control of the formal governing 
apparatus of a particular territorial jurisdiction.261  Once in control of the 
formal political apparatus, the dominant group then is presumed to have 
exclusive control and power over the people and spaces within the 
territorial jurisdiction.262  Moreover, the unstated assumption is that persons 
and entities outside of the jurisdiction are powerless to control events and 
people within a particular jurisdiction given the formal definition of power 
as something within the exclusive control of a sovereign not subject to such 
power.263 
As the analysis in this Section has shown, however, a more realistic 
approach to power would recognize that power is exercised in all 
relationships between people, rather than being exclusively exercised by 
and flowing from a single sovereign source within a particular 
jurisdiction.264  A theory of political power that treats power as a “thing” 
hermetically contained and sealed within the territorial jurisdictional 
boundaries of a particular state or locality obscures power dynamics that 
constantly flow across such boundaries.  Moreover, such a legal narrative 
obscures the fact that jurisdictional boundaries operate to empower certain 
outsiders, as an examination of the power of exit has shown in the context 
of the Richmond urban-suburban race relations. 
D. Revisiting Political Process Theory:  The Politics of Annexation and 
the City of Richmond as a Discrete and Insular Jurisdictional Minority in 
the Virginia Political Process 
Having examined Croson from several different geographic scales, this 
Section will re-examine political process theory from a more informed 
geographic perspective by examining race relations in Virginia as a conflict 
between the state and its local government.  Doing so will ultimately lead 
to a conclusion consistent with the material reality of race relations in 
America:  that African Americans residing in central cities like Richmond 
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continue to experience both political and socioeconomic subordination 
within the state political process. 
Although a full elaboration of a political process theory that incorporates 
the insights of this Article is beyond the scope of this Article, this section 
will set forth a preliminary re-mapping of Equal Protection political 
process theory.  If political process theory is to have any viability as a 
jurisprudential theory for protecting disadvantaged groups, it must 
recognize and incorporate the structural changes in race relations that have 
occurred in recent decades.  In short, a viable political process theory must 
consider now that African Americans experience political disadvantage in 
the way that the state regulates and governs political and economic 
relations between its local governments.  Specifically, such a theory must 
recognize that many states, such as Virginia, have laws that regulate and 
structure their local governments in such a way to make African Americans 
who are segregated in central cities like Richmond systemic losers in the 
state political process. 
1. Re-mapping political process theory—breaking down racial
 segregation to  break down we-they thinking 
Under political process theory, the courts should intervene into the 
legislative process when a malfunction exists to systematically 
disadvantage a discrete and insular minority.265  Judicial intervention in 
such instances serves several purposes.  First, as Ely contends, when 
legislators rely on “we-they” thinking to make classifications, such 
thinking is a primary cause of malfunctions in the political process.266  A 
malfunction in the political process means that groups that actually have 
common interests are systematically pushed towards acting in ways against 
their common interests and in ways that reveal their ignorance of their 
common interests.267  And we-they thinking is a crucial factor in 
contributing to such malfunctions.268 
We-they thinking is not merely a construction of thoughts and beliefs.  In 
other words, we-they thinking along racial lines does not result merely 
because people “think” and believe certain things about other races.  
Further, we-they thinking is not developed in the abstract without the 
influence of historical and geographical context.  In the context of white-
black race relations in America, we-they thinking has a concrete, material 
cause.  We-they thinking is constructed by, and in turn constructs, racial 
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segregation in residency and in education.269  If that is true, we-they 
thinking can be broken down not just by exhorting people to stop thinking 
about race but by breaking down the actual barriers of racial segregation.  
Thus, under a political process theory of equal protection focused on 
breaking down we-they thinking, the courts should intervene where the 
political process systematically reinforces racial segregation patterns in 
education, the workplace, and/or in housing. 
Based on the tentative re-mapping above of a political process theory 
that explicitly takes into account the role of space and geography in 
constructing we-they thinking and in contributing to malfunctions in the 
political process, a strong argument can be made that many states are in 
violation of equal protection because they have arranged their local 
governments in such a way as to reinforce and perpetuate racial 
socioeconomic segregation in metropolitan areas. 
To understand a political process theory that takes into account the 
geography of power is to understand Michel Foucault’s insight that “space 
is fundamental in any exercise of power.”270  A conception of power that 
acknowledges that space is fundamental to any exercise of power will ask:  
Who is actually empowered by a particular arrangement of political places 
and spaces?271  In asking this question, it is crucial to understand that a 
group may be empowered by a particular arrangement of space, spaces, and 
places.  Furthermore, an empowered group may wield leverage and 
influence within a territorial jurisdiction, even if that group or person is not 
a formal member of that territorial jurisdiction, or even if that group is part 
of a minority faction within that territorial jurisdiction.  To put it another 
way, a more realistic conception of power would understand that formal 
political power is not the same as substantive political power.  A group 
may control the formal governing apparatus of a territorial jurisdiction yet 
lack any real substantive political power to successfully enact policies in 
that group’s interest. 
2. The Commonwealth of Virginia’s arrangement of its local  
 governments as a political process defect 
This Section contends that the way the Commonwealth of Virginia has 
arranged and structured its local governments amounts to a malfunction in 
its political process.  Specifically, when examining state and local relations 
through the political fight over annexation, the city of Richmond and its 
predominantly black population can be viewed as a “discrete and insular 
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jurisdictional minority” in the Virginia political process.272  The city of 
Richmond is a city in socioeconomic distress, along with many other 
central cities throughout the United States.  In Croson, the Court struck 
down a modest economic development policy that could have helped 
mitigate the disastrous movement of jobs and industry from the city to the 
suburbs, in Richmond and in other central cities.  A central city like 
Richmond, however, has a more far-reaching tool to rectify its 
socioeconomic distress:  the power of annexation.  According to general 
state annexation laws, a local government such as Richmond may, if it 
meets the legal requirements, annex county property as a way to increase 
its land and tax base.273 
As political scientists contend, annexation is an extremely powerful tool 
for a city to economically revitalize itself.274  For cities such as Richmond 
to effectively deal with its socioeconomic problems, it must become what 
David Rusk calls an “elastic city.”275  The socioeconomic viability of high-
density cities depends heavily on their ability to expand their municipal 
boundaries to capture suburban population growth.276  Typically, cities are 
able to expand their municipal boundaries by annexing new territory.  Rusk 
categorizes central cities into two categories:  elastic cities and inelastic 
cities.  Elastic cities are cities that have experienced population growth 
primarily by aggressively annexing new territory and expanding their 
municipal boundaries.  Inelastic cities, on the other hand, are cities that 
have been, for various reasons, “unable or unwilling to expand their city 
limits.”277  Rusk contends that “being an elastic city is essential to [the] 
economic, social, and fiscal health”278 of a central city.  Studies show that 
elastic cities are healthier economically because they have less racial 
segregation in their housing and schools and are therefore better able to 
attract investment.279 
In Richmond’s case, based on census data from 1950 to 1990, Rusk 
categorizes the city of Richmond as a city with “medium elasticity.”280  The 
reason why the city of Richmond is “inelastic” is because of a state ban on 
its annexation powers.  In 1979, the Commonwealth of Virginia amended 
the state annexation laws to prohibit central cities like Richmond from 
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annexing county territory.281  The Commonwealth of Virginia renewed the 
ban in 1998, and the ban is effective until the year 2010.282  Therefore, the 
city of Richmond cannot expand its municipal boundaries and is severely 
restricted in terms of dealing with the socioeconomic conditions within the 
city of Richmond because the Commonwealth of Virginia, with its majority 
white legislative body, has specifically targeted central cities like 
Richmond from being able to use its annexation powers.  
The annexation political conflict in Virginia is an example of a defect in 
the political process that is systematically disadvantaging African 
Americans via the State’s regulation of its local governments.  This point 
brings us back to political process theory and the question raised in Croson:  
Are Blacks no longer a disadvantaged minority in the political process 
because they dominate the city of Richmond politics?  Richmond’s policies 
are ultimately regulated by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and therefore 
the city cannot utilize its annexation powers by virtue of a decision made 
by the state legislative majority.  Thus, by virtue of a state ban on 
annexation powers, a ban targeting central cities like Richmond, Richmond 
is doomed to be an “inelastic city.”  As an inelastic city, it is severely 
hampered in its ability to address its socioeconomic distress.  Moreover, the 
suburban officials and residents of the Richmond metropolitan area 
population vigorously oppose annexation by the city of Richmond because 
annexation would mean “loss of control over land use, schools, and use of 
tax revenues.”283 
Remapping the political process in Virginia and viewing race relations 
through the geographic lens of urban-suburban relations helps to show that 
Blacks continue to be a disadvantaged group in the Virginia political 
process, except now they are systematically disadvantaged via state 
regulation of its local government units.  Furthermore, territorial 
jurisdiction has become fused with race.  As Professor Moeser contends, 
“With the city [of Richmond] no longer able to expand its boundaries, 
you’ve had a very, very solid black majority, to the point where whole 
jurisdictions can be defined largely by race . . . .”284  Within the 
Commonwealth of Virginia is a political process where identifiably discrete 
and insular black central cities like Richmond are systemic political losers, 
and predominantly white suburban and county interests vigorously oppose 
any regional solutions to the socioeconomic problems of Richmond. 
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Racial politics are taking place in the guise of supposedly “race neutral” 
urban-suburban conflict, yet, the Court is sanctioning such racial politics 
while striking down affirmative action programs that could help to ease the 
socioeconomic distress of urban centers like Richmond.285  If the Court is 
so concerned about racial politics, why are they not concerned about racial 
politics where Whites enact policies that continue to preserve and maintain 
the racial segregation of the races, contributing to racial balkanization, just 
because they are conducted in the guise of facially neutral politics? 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that African Americans 
in Richmond and in other central cities are ambivalent about annexation.286  
Professor Gerald Frug contends that efforts by inner city African 
Americans to enact anti-condominium conversion legislation demonstrate 
that “[m]any Blacks would see the weakening of the city boundary line [via 
annexation] as an attack on the political power they have gained in central 
cities . . . .”287  Thus, African Americans are wary of annexation because 
annexation would mean an increase in the population of Whites in the city, 
and a large enough increase may result in a return to white majority 
population in the city.  Consequently, a strong possibility exists that if the 
city engaged in an aggressive annexation campaign, political control over 
the city council would return to the hands of a white majority. 
African American political leaders in Richmond, therefore, are presented 
with a catch-22—vigorously lobby the state legislature to permit them to 
annex suburban areas as a way to revitalize the city for its constituents and 
risk losing political power, or eschew annexation plans (especially since 
they will not be able to do so at least until 2010) and continue to maintain 
political power in Richmond without the ability to make any meaningful 
changes for their poorest African American constituents. 
This dilemma facing African Americans political leaders illustrates the 
fragile nature of the African American hold on formal political power.  In 
this post-civil rights era, it is ironic and tragic that African Americans 
believe that their tenuous hold on formal political power depends on the 
continuing existence of local government structures that reinforce their 
racial/socioeconomic segregation.  A similar dilemma exists in national 
politics, where the creation of majority-minority voting districts may result 
in a greater number of African American representatives in Congress, but 
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which will also result in a voting phenomenon called “packing,” diluting 
African American political influence in the end.288 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR A GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF LAW AND              
LEGAL NARRATIVES 
A. Critiquing the Racial Progress Teleology in the Master Colorblind     
Legal Narrative 
A spatial critique of the Croson narratives reveals the strong grip of the 
racial progress teleology in the American racial consciousness.  The 
teleology of racial progress can be defined as the belief that American 
society is on a steady, progressive, linear path towards the creation of a 
just, equal colorblind society.  In the racial progress narrative, Croson 
played a major role in reaffirming the “truth” of this narrative because 
black gains in political power signaled the eventual attainment of 
socioeconomic equality between the races.  The premise is that that Blacks 
have political control over many local jurisdictions throughout the nation, 
and now that they are well represented in state and national government, 
they will be able to use their political power to make continuing 
socioeconomic progress.  Under the liberal colorblind narrative, then, 
gaining political power is a sign of both racial political and socioeconomic 
progress.289 
The geographical analysis in this Article exposes a paradox in the 
colorblind narrative of racial progress, as the socioeconomic plight of cities 
like Richmond strongly suggests that this society is not traveling on a 
straight, linear path towards a just, colorblind society.  As argued above, 
African American hold on political power is less a sign of racial progress 
than another manifestation of the continuing socioeconomic and political 
disempowerment experienced by millions of African Americans residing in 
central cities throughout the United States. 
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 B. Hiding Power Relations by Circumscribing the Spatial Setting in          
Legal Narratives 
The analysis above could not have been conducted if we restricted the 
geographic scale or setting in the Croson legal narrative to the city lines of 
Richmond.  A legal narrator must make choices about the geographic 
setting in which the story takes place, and those choices are not neutral, 
inconsequential choices, but choices which have a dramatic effect on the 
representation of “reality” in that narrative.290  In effect, the Croson Court, 
by restricting the geographic scale of its narrative to the city lines of 
Richmond not only obscured power dynamics and relations between the 
Richmond suburbs and the Richmond central city, but also essentially made 
the phenomenon of white suburban political and socioeconomic dominance 
over the predominantly black central city disappear.   
The power of legal narratives to shape and distort our grasp of concrete, 
material reality is even more remarkable considering that there is a wealth 
of social science literature examining the phenomena of political, 
economic, and race relations between suburbs and inner cities in 
metropolitan areas across the United States.291  Legal scholars and social 
scientists clearly understand that formal legal notions of jurisdictionally 
bounded political power does not comport with the reality that power flows 
across jurisdictional lines.  Yet, legal narratives like the ones told in Croson 
are so powerful that they make us forget about what is actually happening 
at the concrete level, and they pull us into a self-contained, nonexistent 
world where power is neatly contained within jurisdictional borders of a 
local government and where power neatly corresponds with numerical 
superiority. 
As the geographical analysis of Croson has hopefully shown, one 
effective means of critiquing dominant legal narratives is to critically 
examine all of its embedded geographic and spatial assumptions.  
                                                 
 290. Although a full analysis of the decision is beyond the scope of this Article, it may 
be useful to briefly discuss the Court’s most recent affirmative action decision, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  Although the Grutter Court held that narrowly tailored 
affirmative action programs in the higher public education context may continue to survive 
equal protection strict scrutiny, Justice O’Connor curiously sidestepped the explicit 
recognition of the continuing unequal socioeconomic conditions experienced by many 
African Americans, while reiterating many of the key “plotlines” in her Croson opinion. 
A critical component of her majority opinion in Grutter is that affirmative action in 
higher education can be justified on grounds of furthering racial diversity and promoting 
First Amendment educational values rather than as a policy tool to explicitly address the 
systematic socioeconomic inequality presently being experienced by African Americans and 
other racial groups.  In short, the Grutter decision, while upholding affirmative action 
programs in higher education, is consistent with the mapping of race relations that the Court 
produced in Croson.  It is consistent with the teleology of “racial progress” theme in the 
master colorblind plot of Equal Protection jurisprudence, and therefore a way to avoid 
dealing with the material reality of race relations that contradict and undermine that theme. 
 291. See, e.g., RUSK, supra note 198; DOWNS, supra note 279, at 269. 
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Accordingly, the hope is that this Article is but the first step in the 
construction of a systematic legal geographical approach to the critical 
analysis of law. 
